Dynamics and Pure Nash Equilibria in Human Decisions by Ricard Trinchet Arnejo
Dynamics and Pure 
Nash Equilibria in 
Human Decisions
Ricard Trinchet Arnejo
Mestrado em Matemâtica
Departamento de Matemâtica
2016
Orientador 
María Victoria Otero Espinar, Professora Titular, Universidade de 
Santiago de Compostela
Coorientador 
Alberto Ádrego Pinto, Professor Catedrático, Faculdade de Ciências 
da Universidade do Porto

Todas  as  correções  determinadas 
pelo júri, e só essas, foram 
efetuadas.
O Presidente do Júri,
Porto, ______/______/_________

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Maria Victoria Otero Espinar
for the useful help, remarks and for the support through the learning process of this
master thesis. Furthermore I would like to thank my co-supervisor Alberto Adrego
Pinto for introducing me to the topic as well as for the warm welcome that he and
his family gave me in Portugal.
Also, I would like to thank my family for supporting me throughout the entire
process and for giving me the needed support. Specially, I would like to thank my
girlfriend Dominika for her infinite patience, support and love. This work is devoted
to all of them.
iii

Resumo
Nesta tese, revemos algumas definições e resultados relativos a Teoria de Jo-
gos Evolutiva, em particular a equação do replicador e sua versão generalizada, o
replicador polimatricial. Revemos o método que estuda o comportamento assimp-
tótico dinâmico do replicador polimatricial. Revemos o modelo de decisão com dois
tipos de decisões e dois tipos de indivíduos. A seguir generalizamos este modelo
para o caso de k indivíduos e n decisões. O EDO associado ao modelo de decisão
é um replicador polimatricial, o que poderá permitir uma aplicação futura do método
de comportamento dinâmico assimptótico para provar a existência de caos no EDO
associado ao modelo de decisão. Para finalizar, encontramos condições suficientes
e necessárias para a existência de equilíbrios de Nash puros no modelo de decisão
no caso 2× 2, que poderão ser generalizadas para o caso k × 2.
Palavras-chave
Teoria de jogos, Teoria de Jogos Evolutivos, equilíbrio de Nash puro, dinâmica
assimptótica.
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Abstract
In this thesis, we review some definitions and results concerning Evolutionary
Game Theory, with special attention to the replicator equation and its generalized
version, the polymatrix equation. Related with this equation, we review a method
that studies the asymptotic behaviour near to the boundary of the polymatrix equa-
tion. After, we review the decision model consisting of two types of individuals and
two decisions. Then, we generalize this model to the case of k types of individuals
and n decisions. The ODE associated to the decision model is indeed a polymatrix
equation, which might permit in the future the application of the assymptotic dynam-
ical method to prove the existence of chaos in the ODE associated to the decision
model. To end, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure
Nash equilibrium in the decision model with 2 decisions and 2 types of individuals,
that can be extended to the k × 2 case.
Key words
Game Theory, Evolutionary Game Theory, pure Nash equilibria, asymptotic dy-
namics.
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Introduction
Game Theory was originally developed as a theory of human strategic behaviour
based on rational decision making. The book Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior [15], published in 1944 by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, is
considered as the initial point of this theory.
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) was started in 1973 with a paper written by
Maynard Smith and Price [14], although there were some previous and isolated
attempts to mix Game Theory and Ecology. Evolutionary Game Theory consists
of the application of Classical Game Theory to Evolutionary Biology, field which is
based on the idea that the genes of an organism determine its observable charac-
teristics. Those organisms which have better genes, will have better characteristics
and, consequently will produce more offspring. As a result, the best genes will tend
to win over the time. EGT relies on the idea of Darwinian natural selection. The
three basic principles of natural selection can be stated as: existence of heritable
variation, struggle for existence and influence of heritable variation in the struggle
(see [4]). The first one refers to the fact that the children must resemble their parents
but with some mutations. The second is based on the consideration of some limiting
factors that force populations to compete for the existing resources. The last one
means that some genetic characteristics will beat others during the struggle. EGT
concerns about the interaction of organisms in a population, according to the three
stated principles of natural selection. The success of an individual in the struggle
will depend on its genetic characteristics and fitness is the measure of how good
are that characteristics. As the success depends on how individuals interact with
ix
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others, fitness cannot be measured in isolation but in the context of the population.
With this idea in mind, we can think of an analogy from this situation with a Game
Theory conflict. The organisms gene characteristics and behaviours are the strate-
gies from the game, fitness corresponds to the payoffs for the individuals and the
fitness of a certain individual depends on the characteristics (strategies) of the other
individuals with which interacts.
Ecology and EGT are closely related. As an example, it serves that the most
common models for populations (Lotka-Volterra equations) and the most common
models for the dynamics frequencies of strategies (replicator equations) are math-
ematically equivalent. The equivalence was proved in 1981 by Josef Hofbauer
(see [12]). In the 1920s Lotka-Volterra equations were independently introduced
by Alfred Lotka and Vito Volterra to model the evolution of chemical and biologi-
cal ecosystems, respectively. This equations are now a mathematical model widely
used in many fields such as Physics, Biology or Economy. In 1978, Peter Taylor
and Leo Jonker introduced the replicator equation which is a central piece of EGT
(see [21]). Other types of replicator-like equations are bimatrix replicator, and its
generalization, the polymatrix replicator. Bimatrix replicator was introduced in 1981
to study the dynamics of bimatrix games, also called asymmetric games, where two
groups of individuals within a population (e.g. males and females), interact using
different sets of strategies, for example, n and m strategies, respectively. In such
games there are no interactions within each group. Polymatrix games are the gen-
eralization of bimatrix game to the case where we have any finite number of groups
interact, each of them using a different set of strategies. In [2], Alishah and Duarte
define the polymatrix replicator, which is the generalization of the replicator equation
to polymatrix games. This extended replicator equation is defined on a product of
simplexes, which it will be an example of what is called polytope. This is how EGT is
related with polytopes theory. In [6], a method to study the behaviour of dynamical
systems defined on polytopes was introduced. It is also treated on the later works
[1] and [18].
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This work is organized in three chapters. In chapter 1, we give a preliminary
introduction to EGT, starting with the basic concepts of the field and focusing on
the mentioned replicator equations. We also remark the equivalence between this
equation and Lotka-Volterra model. This chapter is intended to be a short intro-
duction to the field, with the basic elements needed to follow the rest of the work.
In the second chapter, we focus on polymatrix games. For that, we introduce the
mentioned method presented by P. Duarte, with special attention to the polymatrix
replicator equation. In chapter 3, we present the decision model introduced in [19],
first in the 2 × 2 case and then we extend it to the general k × n case. We finally
conclude that this general model can be seen as a polymatrix replicator and thus,
the method presented in the second chapter can be used to study the behaviour of
this system. In this dissertation, for the model of dimension 2×2, we give necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria for all point in R2.
A future work will be the extension of this results to the k × 2 case. All the figures
appearing on this thesis were made using GeoGebra.
xii
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Chapter 1
Evolutionary Game Theory
This chapter is intended to give a short introduction to some of the basic concepts in
Evolutionary Game Theory and to present, at first, replicator equation for symmetric
games and then, the analogous versions for asymmetric games.
In the first section we give a introduction to the Classical Game Theory and
some of its key concepts, such as pure and mixed strategies and Nash equilibria.
In the second section we introduce Evolutionary Game Theory and the main
concept of evolutionarily stable strategy. We also see the relation between this
concept and Nash equilibria.
In the third section, we let dynamics come into service, with the replicator equa-
tion, which models the evolution of the growth rate of the different strategies. We
derive the equation and then we see it is invariant on its phase space, the simplex.
Replicator equation in this section is valid only for symmetric games.
In the fourth section, we briefly introduce Lotka-Volterra equations, and we state
its equivalence to the replicator equation.
In the fifth section, we consider asymmetric games for populations divided in two
groups and its corresponding replicator equation.
To conclude, in the last section we generalize the replicator equation for asym-
metric games with a finite number p of groups. We introduce some of the notation
used in [1] and [18], which will be important in the rest of the work.
1
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1.1 Classical Game Theory
Our aim here is to give a short introduction to the terminology related to the Classi-
cal Game Theory. For ’game’, we understand an interactive decision problem which
involves two or more individuals, which we shall call ’players’, whose decisions de-
termine their gains inside the game.
More specifically, we want to introduce static games, that is, those games in
which a single decision is made by each player, and each player has no knowledge
of the decision made by the other players before making its own decision. To keep
the notation simple, we will only concentrate on two-player games.
In this field, the concept of strategy plays an important role. The word strategy
is derived from the Greek word strategos, which means military commander or, col-
loquially, plan of action. Thus, a strategy is a rule for choosing a decision whenever
it is needed.
If we want to describe a static game, we need to specify the following:
• the set of players, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• a pure strategy set, Si, for each player.
• payoffs for each player i facing any other player j, which are given by functions
pii : Si × Sj → R.
As it is usual in this theory, we assume that payoffs represent the preferences of
rational individuals and that the aim of the players is to maximise their payoff. A pure
strategy is one strategy for which there is no randomisation. When randomisation
is considered, we arrive to the concept of mixed strategy, which, for a player i,
specifies the probabilities of choosing any strategy s ∈ Si. A mixed strategy will be
denoted by σi and the set of all possible mixed strategies for player i will be denoted
by Σi.
So, imagine one player has to choose between the pure strategies {s1, . . . , sn}.
Then, a mixed strategy will be represented by a probability vector σ = (p(s1), . . . , p(sn)),
being p(si) the probability to play strategy si. In this way, pure strategies are also
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represented as such vectors: s1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), s2 = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and so on.
Thus, mixed strategies can be written as a linear combinations of pure strategies
σ =
n∑
i=1
p(si)si.
If we denote the probability of using pure strategy s by p(s) for player 1 and by
q(s) for player 2, then the payoffs for mixed strategies are given by
pii(σ1, σ2) =
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
p(s1)q(s2)pii(s1, s2).
The payoffs are assumed to be a representation of the preferences of rational
individuals or, depending on the case, of their biological fitness, so every individual
wants to maximise its payoff.
Notation 1. A solution of a game is a pair of strategies that two rational players
can use. Solutions will be denoted enclosing a strategy pair within brackets, like, for
example (σ1, σ2), where the strategy adopted by player 1 is placed first.
Remark 1.1. As here we are considering games where all players have the same
payoffs, we will note pii = pi, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Now, we introduce one of the key concepts of Game Theory, the well-known
concept of a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.2. A Nash equilibrium (for two player games) is a pair of strategies
(σ∗1, σ∗2) such that:
(1) pi(σ∗1, σ∗2) ≥ pi(σ1, σ∗2), for all σ1 ∈ Σ1.
(2) pi(σ∗1, σ∗2) ≥ pi(σ∗1, σ2), for all σ2 ∈ Σ2.
The equilibrium is called symmetric when σ∗1 = σ∗2.
Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as one strategy in which changing is penal-
ized, that is, if one individual uses a Nash equilibrium strategy and then changes to
another strategy, then its payoff is reduced.
4
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Definition 1.3. The support of a strategy σ is the set S(σ) ⊂ S of all strategies for
which p(s) > 0, for the strategy σ.
Let us give one simple example to make clearer the concept of support.
Example 1.4. Let the strategy set for an individual be S = {L,M,R} and let σ be a
mixed strategy given by σ = (0, p, 1− p), with p ∈ (0, 1). Then, S(σ) = {M,R}.
The following result tells us that, inside the support of a Nash equilibrium, devi-
ation is not penalized.
Proposition 1.5. Let (σ∗1, σ∗2) be a Nash equilibrium. Also, let S∗1 be the support of
σ∗1 and S∗2 the support of σ∗2. Then,
(1) pi(s, σ∗2) = pi(σ∗1, σ∗2), for s ∈ S∗1 .
(2) pi(σ∗1, s) = pi(σ∗1, σ∗2), for s ∈ S∗2 .
We state now a well-known result which was proved by John Nash in his PhD
thesis, whose proof uses fixed point results. For more details, one can check the
books [8] and [16].
Theorem 1.6. Every game that has a finite strategic form1 has at least one Nash
equilibrium, involving pure or mixed strategies.
Example 1.7. Prisoner’s dilemma.
Two criminals are catched by the police and they are being questioned in relation
with a important case. They are in different rooms, without any connection between
them, so they cannot communicate to each other. The police knows that they are
guilty (at least one of them) but, without any confession, they cannot be sent to jail.
The captain has an idea to make them talk. One deal is offered to both prisoners,
independently: if you confess that the other is guilty and the other fails to confess,
then you will be set free and your partner will be sent to jail for 10 years. If both of
1A game with finite strategic form is a game with finite number of players and finite number of pure
strategies for each player
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you confess the crime, then both of you will go to jail for 9 years. If no one confess,
then both of you will be in the prison for only one year.
Let S be stay silent and C be confess. The strategic set for this game is {S,C}.
Payoff for this game is given in the following table.
S C
S −1,−1 −10, 0
C 0,−10 −9,−9
What is the best each prisoner can do? Start by thinking as if you were prisoner
1 (P1). When prisoner 2 (P2) is quiet, it is better for you to confess as you will obtain
freedom, rather than 1 year in prison. On the other hand, when P2 confesses, then
you should also confess, as you will obtain 9 years in prison, rather than 10 if you
stay silent. So, the best for you is to confess, independently of what P2 will do. As
this game is symmetric, for P2 the best choice is also to confess, so, if we assume
that both prisoners act rationally, then they both should confess. So, the strategy
(C,C) is a Nash equilibrium for this game.
It is interesting to note that, although (C,C) is a Nash equilibrium, it is not the
best situation for both-players, as they will obtain a better payoff if they confess and
the other stays quiet.
Remark 1.8. Just to mention, we can also consider another version of the prisoner’s
dilemma, on which one prisoner knows what the other has done. In that case, the
outcome of the game will change. This set up falls into the so called dynamic games,
where decisions are made in different times.
1.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
In the Classical Game Theory, the outcome depends on the choices made by ratio-
nal individuals. So, the interpretation for Nash equilibria is that each player uses a
strategy that is a best response to the strategy chosen by the other. In 1973, May-
nard Smith and Price first applied the ideas of Game Theory to model the behaviour
6
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of animals (see [14]). At that time, it was odd to apply such theory, which always
considered that rational players were involved, to animals that might not seem ra-
tional. To successfully adapt that theory to animals, three shifts were made in the
following concepts: strategy, equilibrium and player interactions.
Now, strategic sets are genotypic variants and individuals inherit strategies, that
are passing through the generations. Equilibrium now corresponds to the new con-
cept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), that is just a strategy that, when all popu-
lation is using it, it fares well against mutation introduced into the population. Player
interactions are considered to be random, as it is chance who picks up the agents
who will play their strategies only according to their genome.
The payoff to an individual using some strategy is identified with the fitness of
that strategy in the current population. Fitness is measured by the expected off-
spring of the individual. Because animals with more fitness will leave more offspring,
the population composition will change at each stage.
So the frame in this theory will be a population, whose individuals choose be-
tween a set of n pure strategies. The important thing here is the frequency of use
of each strategy inside the population and how this frequency evolves with the time.
It is interesting to mark that there is some underlying dynamics in this concept,
as we are interested to know how the frequencies evolve. When referring to popula-
tion frequency, we are going to use the concept of population profile. Let S denote
the set of possible pure strategies.
Definition 1.9. A population profile is a vector x that gives the probability x(s) with
which each strategy s ∈ S is played in the population.
Given an individual using a strategy σ and inside a population with profile x, its
payoff is defined by
pi(σ, x) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)pi(s, x).
We can see this as the payoff obtained for an individual using σ and playing ’against’
the population with profile x. The payoffs for such case correspond to the number of
FCUP
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descendants that individuals have. This is called game against the field, which we
shall just mention here.
In the called pairwise contest game2, where an individual plays against a ran-
domly selected opponent, the payoff for any individual using a strategy σ is
pi(σ, x) =
∑
s∈S
∑
s′∈S
p(s)x(s′)pi(s, s′).
This is the same payoff than the one for an individual using strategy σ facing an
opponent with strategy σ′, where, under σ′, we have p′(s) = x(s), for s ∈ S. So, it
is always possible to associate a two-player game with a population game involving
pairwise contests.
Let us come back now to the idea introduced earlier. For this purpose, consider
a population where in the initial stage, all the individuals adopt some strategy σ∗.
Suppose that a mutation occurs and a small proportion ε of individuals use some
other strategy σ. The population after the appearance of the mutants is called the
post-entry population and is denoted by xε. Evolutionary stable strategies are de-
fined as follows.
Definition 1.10. A mixed strategy is called evolutionarily stable (E.S.S.) if, for σ 6= σ∗,
there exists some ε¯ = ε¯(p) > 0 such that
pi(σ∗, xε) > pi(σ, xε) (1.1)
holds for all 0 < ε < ε¯.
That is, σ∗ is the best choice when another strategy σ appears, in small amount,
in the population, so σ will not spread and σ∗ will remain in the population.
Proposition 1.11. Let σ∗ be an E.S.S. in a pairwise contest. Then, for all σ 6= σ∗
either
(1) pi(σ∗, σ∗) > pi(σ, σ∗), or
(2) pi(σ∗, σ∗) = pi(σ, σ∗) and pi(σ∗, σ) > pi(σ, σ).
2this name is used in the book [22].
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Conversely, if either (1) or (2) holds for each σ 6= σ∗ in a two-player game, then
σ∗ is an E.S.S. in the corresponding population game.
Some authors define an evolutionarily stable strategy directly using (1)-(2).
Observe that condition (1) is exactly the definition of σ∗ being a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 1.12. Every evolutionarily stable strategy σ∗ is also a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Note that Nash equilibrium condition in this case is pi(σ∗, σ∗) ≥ pi(σ, σ∗), for
all σ 6= σ∗.
It is not true that all games have an E.S.S., as we will see in Example 1.22
where a game without any E.S.S. is considered.
1.3 Replicator dynamics
With E.S.S., we started to introduce ’some’ dynamics into scene, as we were in-
terested into the study of how the population will evolve under natural selection.
Here, our purpose is to go one step further and introduce the called replicator dy-
namics, the point where Game Theory meets Dynamical Systems theory. We con-
sider a population formed by different kinds of individuals that use some strategy
and pass it to its descendants. Here, individuals only use pure strategies from the
set S = {s1, . . . , sn}. We set ni to be the number of individuals of the population
that use strategy si. The number of individuals in the whole population is given by
N =
∑n
i=1 ni. It will be interesting, as it was in the case of E.S.S., to know the
frequencies of use for each pure strategy, that is,
xi =
ni
N
.
In this way, we define
Definition 1.13. A population state is a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi = niN .
FCUP
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Define the average payoff in the population by:
p¯i(x) =
n∑
i=1
xipi(si, x),
where pi(si, x) denotes the payoff for an individual with strategy si.
Let β be the per capita birth rate and δ the per capita death rate of the population.
Then, the time evolution of the number of individuals using strategy si is given by:
n˙i = (β − δ + pi(si, x))ni = (β − δ + pi(si, x))xiN.
Also, the rate of change of the population size is
N˙ =
n∑
i=1
n˙i =
n∑
i=1
(β − δ)ni +
n∑
i=1
pi(si, x)ni
= (β − δ)
n∑
i=1
ni +N
n∑
i=1
pi(si, x)xi = (β − δ + p¯i(x))N.
We are mainly interested on the rate change of each xi. From the relation
ni = xiN , we have
n˙i = x˙iN + xiN˙
and
x˙iN = n˙i − xiN˙ = (β − δ + pi(si, x))xiN − (β − δ + p¯i(x))xiN
Dividing by N , we arrive to the following system of O.D.E’s:
x˙i = (pi(si, x)− p¯i(x))xi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (1.2)
called replicator equation. Here, if one strategy has better payoff than average, will
spread among the population.
The phase space of the replicator equation is the simplex ∆n−1, defined as
∆n−1 =
{
x ∈ Rn/
n∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0
}
.
The following is satisfied:
Lemma 1.14. The simplex ∆n−1 and its faces are invariant under (1.2).
10
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Proof. The n−plane given by the condition ∑ni=1 xi = 1, which contains ∆n−1, is
invariant, as:
(
n∑
i=1
xi
)·
=
n∑
i=1
x˙i =
n∑
i=1
xipi(si, x)−
n∑
i=1
xip¯i(x) = p¯i(x)− p¯i(x)
n∑
i=1
xi
= p¯i(x)− p¯i(x) = 0.
Also, given any q−dimensional face of the simplex, the q−plane containing that
face is also invariant, with 0 < q < n.
There exist some relations between the equilibria of (1.2) and E.S.S. and Nash
equilibria strategies, that we shall see for pairwise contest games. We give a defini-
tion and introduce some notation before continuing.
Definition 1.15. Let x˙ = f(x) be a dynamical system and x∗ be an equilibrium of
the system. The fixed point x∗ is said to be:
a) Stable: if for all neighbourhood V of x∗, there is a neighbourhood V1 ⊂ V such
that every solution x(t) with x(0) = x0 ∈ V1 is defined and lies in V for all t > 0.
b) Unstable: if it is not stable.
c) Asymptotically stable: if it is stable and, further, V1 can be chosen so that
x(t)→ x∗, as t→∞.
Notation 2. Let F be the set of fixed points and let A be the set of asymptotically
stable fixed points of the replicator equation (1.2). Consider now the symmetric
game corresponding to the replicator dynamics and let N be the set of Nash equi-
librium strategies and let E be the set of E.S.S.s in that game.
It holds that, for any pairwise contest game, the following relationships are sat-
isfied for any strategy σ and the corresponding population state x:
(1) If σ ∈ E, then x ∈ A.
(2) If x ∈ A, then σ ∈ N.
FCUP
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(3) If σ ∈ N, then x ∈ F
If we identify strategies with their corresponding population states, we can ex-
press this as the following chain:
E ⊂ A ⊂ N ⊂ F.
Our aim now is to state that fact, dividing it in three theorems. Before that, we
introduce the concept of relative entropy function, which has something in common
with the stability of fixed points:
Definition 1.16. Given a population state x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗n), the relative entropy
function is defined as
V : Rn −→ R
x 7−→ V (x) = −
k∑
i=1
x∗i log
(
xi
x∗i
)
The importance of this function resides on the fact that if its time derivative,
evaluated in points along solution trajectories and with x∗ fixed point, is positive,
the fixed point x∗ is unstable and. In the case it is zero, then the evolution of the
population is periodic around the fixed point.
It is also important in this theory, as it usually serves as a Lyapunov function for
the replicator equation.
We recall the concept of Lyapunov function:
Definition 1.17. Let x˙ = f(x) be a dynamical system with a fixed point at x∗. A
strict Lyapunov function for the dynamical system is a scalar function V (x) defined
in a neighbourhood of the fixed point x∗ and satisfying the conditions
(i) V (x∗) = 0
(ii) V (x) > 0 for x 6= x∗
(iii) V˙ (x) < 0 for x 6= x∗.
12
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If such a function exists for the fixed point x∗, then x∗ will be asymptotically
stable. This fact is useful for the proof of the following result, where the relative
entropy function serves as a Lyapunov function. (see [22]).
Theorem 1.18. Given a strategy σ which is an E.S.S., the population with x = σ is
asymptotically stable.
To complete the previous subset chain we state the following results, whose
proofs can be found in [22].
Theorem 1.19. If x is an asymptotically stable fixed point of the replicator dynamics,
then the symmetric strategy pair (σ, σ) with σ = x is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1.20. If (σ, σ) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, then the population state
σ = x is a fixed point of the replicator dynamics.
We finish this section with one example. Before that, we give a necessary defi-
nition (see [9]).
Definition 1.21. Let x˙ = f(x) be a dynamical system. A heteroclinic orbit for the
system is a union of distinct fixed points and the trajectories connecting them. Het-
eroclinic cycles are closed paths formed of heteroclinic orbits.
Example 1.22. Consider the well-known rock-scissors-paper game. Let us remem-
ber how it works. Two players are involved, each player has three possible strate-
gies, rock (R), paper (P) and scissors (S). When both players choose the same
strategy, no one wins and, in other case, R beats S, S beats P and P beats R. A
payoff table for this game can be:
R S P
R 0, 0 1,−1 −1, 1
S −1, 1 0, 0 1,−1
P 1,−1 −1, 1 0, 0
FCUP
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The game has an only Nash equilibrium (σ, σ), where σ = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). Nevertheless,
this strategy is not an E.S.S. We have that
pi(σ,R) =
1
3
pi(R,R) +
1
3
pi(P,R) +
1
3
pi(S,R) = 0− 1
3
+
1
3
= 0
and
pi(R,R) = 0,
so, the strategy (σ, σ) cannot be an E.S.S.
Being Nash equilibrium is a necessary condition to be E.S.S., thus, no such
strategy exists for this game.
Now, let us make the replicator dynamics into scene. Let x1 be the proportion
of R−players, x2 the proportion of S− players and x3 the proportion of P−players.
The population state x is given by x = (x1, x2, x3). We have:
pi(S,X) = x1pi(S, S) + x2pi(S,R) + x3pi(S, P ) = x3 − x2,
pi(R,X) = x1pi(R,S) + x2pi(R,R) + x3pi(R,P ) = x1 − x3,
pi(P,X) = x1pi(P, S) + x2pi(P,R) + x3pi(P, P ) = x2 − x1,
so, the replicator equation in this case results:
x˙1 = x1(x3 − x2)
x˙2 = x2(x1 − x3)
x˙3 = x3(x2 − x1)
The fixed points for this system are (1, 0, 0) ≡ R, (0, 1, 0) ≡ S, (0, 0, 1) ≡ P and
z = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3).
Also, it can be seen that, restricting ourselves to the boundaries, that the be-
haviour is R → S → P → R. This implies that there exists some kind of cyclic
behaviour around the other fixed point z. To know whether this spiral cycles are
14
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periodic orbits, attracting to the boundaries or to the fixed point z will be possible
with the observation made about the derivative of the relative entropy function.
The relative entropy function is here given by
V (x) = −
3∑
i=1
1
3
log(3xi)
and its derivative is
d
dt
V (x) = −1
3
x˙i
xi
= −1
3
((x3 − x2) + (x1 − x3) + (x2 − x1)) = 0.
Then, we must have periodic orbits around z.
In [23], the Lyapunov function V (x) = x1x2x3 is suggested. As ddtV (x) = 0, then
the solution curves are the level curves of the function V , which are closed curves
surrounding z.
Another approach to detect whether the boundary heteroclinic cycles are attract-
ing or not is given in [11], but we shall not introduce it here.
Remark 1.23. Of special interest is the case when the function pi(si, x) is linear. For
this case, there exists a matrix A = (aij) ∈ Mn(R) such that pi(si, x) = (Ax)i. Also,
we have that p¯i(x) = xTAx. The replicator equation can be written as:
x˙i =
(
(Ax)i − xTAx
)
xi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (1.3)
1.4 Lotka-Volterra equation
In the 1920s, Alfred Lotka suggested that a system of two biological species could
oscillate permanently. For that, he purposed the following system of differential
equations:
dx
dt
= ax− bxy
dy
dt
= −cy + dxy, (1.4)
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where x(t) and y(t) denoted the population number of both species and where
a, b, c, d > 0. He published this equation (among others) in a book entitled Elements
of Physical Biology in 1925. However, it did not draw much attention at that time.
Nevertheless, the famous mathematician Vito Volterra rediscovered the same model
independently, while studying a fishery problem. He was interested into explaining
the reason why the proportion of cartilaginous fish was increased during the First
World War period. These fishes are predators of smaller fish and, during this pe-
riod, fishing effort was reduce, so that could be the reason why cartilaginous fish
proportion raised. To explain this situation, he proposed the model (1.4), where now
x(t) stands for the number of prey and y(t) stands for the number of predators. He
published it in an article in 1926. Although Lotka discovered the model earlier, his
work would not always be mentioned.
The general Lotka-Volterra equation for n populations of competing species has
the form
x˙i = xi
ri + n∑
j=1
aijxj
 i = 1, . . . , n, (1.5)
where xi denotes the population densities, ri are the intrinsic growth or decay
rate from population i and the aij describe the effect of population j over population
i. Matrix A = (aij) is called interaction matrix. The state space of (1.5) is the orthant
Rn+ = {x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn/ xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n}.
Boundary points from the state space correspond to coordinate planes xi = 0,
which means that species i is absent. Thus, the boundary is invariant, as if xi(t) = 0
is the solution of the i−th equation of (1.5) satisfying xi(0) = 0. As a consequence,
Rn+ is invariant under (1.5).
After this short introduction of Lotka-Volterra equation, let us state its equiva-
lence to the replicator equation (1.3).
Note that Lotka-Volterra equation is a quadratic equation on Rn+, while replicator
equation is cubic on the compact ∆n−1. However, it turns out that the replicator
equation in n variables x1, . . . , xn is equivalent to the Lotka-Volterra equation in
16
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n − 1 variables y1, . . . , yn−1. We state here this result, proved by Hofbauer, whose
proof can be checked in [13].
Theorem 1.24. Let Sˆn−1 = {x ∈ ∆n−1/ xn > 0}. There exists a differentiable and
invertible map
F : Sˆn−1 −→ Rn−1+
mapping the orbits of the replicator equation
x˙i =
(
(Ax)i − xTAx
)
xi, i = 1, . . . , n
onto the orbits of the Lotka-Volterra equation
y˙i = yi
ri + n∑
j=1
a′ijyj
 , i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
where ri = ain − ann and a′ij = aij − anj .
As a consequence, results about replicator equation can be carried over to the
Lotka-Volterra equations.
1.5 Bimatrix games
Up to this point, we have only considered situations where all players are in symmet-
ric positions, that is, they have same payoffs and same set of strategies. However,
in many conflicts that is not the case. There can be some differences between the
players, depending on some characteristics, as being male or female, be weak or
strong, etc. To solve this kind of situations, for pairwise conflicts, we are led to
bimatrix games.
We distinguish between players in position I and position II. First player has n
strategies and the second has m strategies. Payoffs for this players are given by
matrices A and B, respectively. We assume that players in position I can only
play against players in position II and vice-versa. Mixed strategies are denoted by
p ∈ ∆n−1 for player I and by q ∈ ∆m−1 for player II.
Nash equilibrium can be also defined for this kind of games.
FCUP
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Definition 1.25. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (pˆ, qˆ) ∈ ∆n−1 × ∆m−1
such that:
(1) pi1(pˆ, qˆ) ≥ pi1(p, qˆ), for all p ∈ ∆n−1.
(2) pi2(pˆ, qˆ) ≥ pi2(pˆ, q), for all q ∈ ∆m−1.
For games in the previous sections, we had a symmetric scenario: player in
position I using i against a player II using j obtains the same payoff as a player II
playing j against a player I using i. For those games, we had A = B.
While Nash equilibria can be extended to asymmetric games, there is no obvious
extension to the concept of evolutionary stability to asymmetric games.
Now, let us denote by x ∈ ∆n−1 and y ∈ ∆m−1 the frequencies of strategies
for players I and II. We can also associate a differential equation to this asymmetric
case, just as in the symmetric case, making the assumption that the rate of increase
of any strategy xi, that is, x˙i/xi is equal to the difference between its payoff, given
by (Ay)i and the average payoff in the population, given by xAy. Making the same
assumption for player II strategies, we obtain two different equations:
x˙i = xi ((Ay)i − xAy) , i = 1, . . . , n
y˙j = yj ((Bx)j − yBx) , j = 1, . . . ,m, (1.6)
which are invariant on ∆n−1 ×∆m−1.
1.6 Polymatrix games
Let us now introduce polymatrix games, where the population is divided in a finite
number of groups, say p, each one with a finite number of strategies and where
interactions between any two players are allowed (even if they are from the same
group). Polymatrix games serve as a generalization of symmetric and asymmetric
games that we have seen so far in this work. The differential equation associated to
this game, the polymatrix replicator, which was introduced in [2], is a generalization
18
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of the replicator equations in the symmetric case (1.3) and the asymmetric case
(1.6). This equation will be defined on a product of simplices.
Let us consider a population divided in p groups, which are tagged by an integer
α ∈ {1, . . . , p}. The individuals from a given group α have a number nα of possible
strategies. This strategies are tagged by integers in the following range:
n1 + n2 + . . .+ np−1 < j ≤ n1 + . . . np (1.7)
That is, any strategy is given by an integer j = 1, . . . , n, with n = n1 + . . . + np.
We will write j ∈ α to mean that j is a strategy from the group α, that is, when (1.7)
occurs.
With this ingredients, we can now define what is a polymatrix game:
Definition 1.26. A polymatrix game is an ordered pair, denoted by (n,A), where
n = (n1, . . . , np) is a list of positive integers, called the game type, that represents
the number of decisions of each group α and where A ∈ Mn(R), called the payoff
matrix of the game.
Given two strategies i ∈ α and j ∈ β, the enter aij on the matrix A represents
the average payoff for an individual using strategy i who is facing another individual
using strategy j. For this reason, the matrix A can be decomposed in p2 block ma-
trices Aαβ, of dimension nα × nβ and whose entries are denoted by aij = aαβij , with
α, β ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Each block Aαβ gives us the payoff for interactions of individuals
in the group α with individuals in β.
Note that one point x = (xα)α ∈ Rn describes the state of the population in such
game. The point x belongs to the following product of simplexes:
Γn := ∆
n1−1 ×∆n2−1 × . . .×∆np−1 ⊂ Rn,
called prism. We recall that the nα−dimension simplex is defined by
∆nα−1 =
{
x ∈ Rnα/
nα∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0
}
.
The entry xj = xαj of x represents the frequency of usage of the strategy j inside
the group α. This means that we can also decompose x ∈ Rn in p parts: xα ∈ Rnα ,
where α ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
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With (Ax)i =
∑n
j=1 aijxj we represent the payoff for a player who is choosing
the strategy i and
∑p
β=1(x
α)tAαβxβ gives us the payoff that a player can expect
in the game. Thus the difference (Ax)i −
∑p
β=1(x
α)tAαβxβ represents the relative
fitness of the strategy i ∈ α, inside the group α. We obtain the polymatrix replicator
dynamics as:
dxαi
dt
= xαi
(Ax)i − p∑
β=1
(xα)tAαβxβ
 , (1.8)
∀i ∈ α, with α ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
This system can be also represented as
x˙αi
xαi
= (Ax)i −
p∑
β=1
(xα)tAαβxβ. (1.9)
The phase space of this O.D.E’s system is the prism Γn defined before. We will
denote the flow associated to (1.8) by XA = X(n,A).
Remark 1.27. Both notations (1.8) and (1.9) are the same. To justify the presence
of both, we say that the first one appears in the works of Duarte and Peixe ([1], [18])
while the latter is more usual in the rest of the literature and, in particular, it will be
used later on in this work.
Remark 1.28. When p = 1, equation (1.9) is just the usual replicator equation as-
sociated to the payoff matrix A and defined on the space Γn := ∆n−1.
For p = 2, with the restriction A11 = A22 = 0 (that is, individuals who are from
the same group cannot compete), equation (1.9) becomes the bimatrix replicator
equation, associated to the payoff matrices A12 and A21, defined on Γn := ∆n1−1 ×
∆n2−1.
Lemma 1.29. The flowXA leaves invariant the prism Γn. In particular, it leaves each
of the simplexes ∆nα−1 invariant, for α ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.14.
Now we will set when two polymatrix games with the same type n are equivalent.
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Definition 1.30. Two polymatrix games (n,A) and (n,B) are equivalent if the rows
of the block matrix Aαβ − Bαβ are equal, for α, β ∈ {1, . . . , p}. We will indicate this
by (n,A) ∼ (n,B).
Now we will state two results concerning the vector field XA. The first one,
motivates the previous definition, as two equivalent games define the same flow,
while the second characterizes the equilibria of the polimatrix replicator.
Proposition 1.31. Let (n,A) and (n,B) be two equivalent polymatrix games. Then,
X(n,A) = X(n,B) on the prism Γn.
Proposition 1.32. Let (n,A) be a polymatrix game and q ∈ int(Γn). The point q is
an equilibrium of (1.8) if and only if (Aq)i = (Aq)j , for all strategies i, j ∈ α and for
α ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
Example 1.33. (From [18]) Consider the polymatrix game ((5), A), with
A =

0 −2 2 −2 2
2 0 −2 0 0
−2 2 0 −3 0
2 0 3 0 −2
−2 0 0 2 0

.
That is, we have a population formed by only one group, whose members can de-
cide between 5 possible decisions. The point q =
(
1
8 ,
5
16 ,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,
5
16
)
satisfies (Aq)1 =
(Aq)2 = (Aq)3 = (Aq)4 = (Aq)5 and then, q is an equilibrium of the polymatrix
replicator derived from ((5), A).
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Chapter 2
Dynamics of the polymatrix
replicator
Duarte and Peixe had already shown the existence of chaos using their method, for
two particular examples (check [18] for an example of a polymatrix replicator and [5]
for a Lotka Volterra system). In the future, we would like to use the present method
to classify the possible asymptotic dynamics of our model and, in particular, to show
the existence of chaos for some values.
The idea we pursue in this chapter is to introduce succinctly the method appear-
ing in [1], [18], which was firstly presented in [6].
The method envelopes the asymptotic dynamics of the flow associated to vector
fields defined in certain geometrical objects, called polytopes, which will be defined
more precisely later. The process is the following: start with a vector field X de-
fined on a polytope, then consider its associated flow ϕtX . From certain local data
obtained from X near each vertex of the polytope, we construct a piecewise linear
vector field, which inhabits in a new object, called dual cone of the initial polytope.
Through the study of this latter vector field, we are able to analyse the asymptotic
behaviour of ϕtX along the heteroclinic network of the polytope. To make this study,
we use Poincaré maps for the original vector field and for the piecewise constant
field.
23
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The idea of this chapter is to introduce briefly the terminology used in the men-
tioned sources ([1], [18] and [6]) to set up the basis of a future work.
In the first section, we start introducing the called polytopes. This geometrical
object is the natural place where many replicator equations are defined. In the
second, we introduce vector fields defined on polytopes and we focus our attention
in the vector field defined by the polymatrix equation. The characters, which are
the eigenvalues on the pure strategies, are computed for this equation. In the third
section, we introduce a change of coordinates which sends any vector field defined
on a polytope to a piecewise constant vector field defined on a new object, called
dual cone of the original polytope, which is introduced in the fourth section.
In the fifth section, the piecewise linear fields we obtained are studied. We
associate a graph to the vertices of the polytope that have a certain kind of behaviour
with respect to the field, that ensures the existence of heteroclinic cycles in the
edges of the polytope. From this graph, we are interested on the existing cycles
and on the called structural sets, which are the minimal set of edges through which
every cycle should pass. Next, Poincaré maps are defined to study when the flow
returns to cross sections glued to the structural set.
In the next section, Poincaré maps for the piecewise constant flow are given. It
is stated that, asymptotically, this two kinds of Poincaré maps are in some sense
equivalent.
In the last section, a brief idea about the projetive Poincaré map is given.
2.1 Polytopes
Definition 2.1. A simple d-dimensional polytope is a compact convex subset Γd ⊂
Rn of dimension d and affine support Ed for which there exist a family of affine
functions {fi : Ed → R}i∈I such that
i) Γd = ∩i∈If−1i ([0,+∞)).
ii) Γd ∩ f−1i (0) 6= ∅, for all i ∈ I.
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iii) given any J ⊂ I such that Γd ∪ ( ∩j∈J f−1j (0)) 6= ∅, then the the linear 1-forms
dfj are linearly independent at every point p ∈ ∩j∈Jf−1j (0).
We will say that {fi}i∈I is the defining family of the polytope Γd.
Now we will see more precisely what we understand for face of a polytope.
Definition 2.2. Let Γd be a simple polytope with defining family {fi}i∈I . A non-
empty subset ρ ⊂ Γd is called a r−face if there exists d − r functions, fi1 , . . . , fid−r
in {fi}i∈I such that we can obtain ρ as
ρ = Γd ∩ f−1i1 (0) ∩ . . . ∩ f−1id−r(0).
Kr(Γd) will denote the set of all r−faces of Γd.
Each element in V := K0(Γd) is called vertex of Γd, each element in E :=
K1(Γd) is called edge of Γd and the (d − 1)−faces of Γd, that is, elements of F :=
Kd−1(Γd), are called faces of the polytope.
Remark 2.3. The term simple in the definition of polytope means that each vertex
of Γd has exactly d incident edges.
Definition 2.4. A corner of the polytope is an element on the set
C := {(v, γ, σ) ∈ V × E × F : γ ∩ σ = {v}}.
Figure 2.1: One corner (v, σ, γ) of the polytope [0, 1]3
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Definition 2.5. Given a vertex v ∈ V , we denote by Ev and Fv the set of all edges,
respectively faces, which contain the vertex v.
Remark 2.6. 1. Given a family {fi}i∈I defining a polyhedron Γd, by condition ii)
in the definition of a polytope, the correspondence i 7→ Γd ∩ f−1i (0) induces a
one to one map between the index family I and the set of the polytope’s faces
F . Thus, from now on we shall assume that the family defining a polytope is
always indexed in F in such a way that σ = Γd ∩ f−1σ (0).
2. Notice that any pair of the three elements in a corner determines uniquely the
third one. So, we will refer to the corner (v, γ, σ) shortly as (v, γ) or (v, σ).
3. An edge γ with endpoints v1 and v2 determines two corners, (v1, γ, σ1) and
(v2, γ, σ2), that are called the end corners of γ. The faces σ1 and σ2 are called
the opposite faces of γ.
4. The sets Ev and Fv have exactly d elements, as Γd is a simple polytope.
We note that, because of iii) in Definition 2.1, for every v ∈ V the covectors
{(dfσ)v/ σ ∈ Fv} are linearly independent. This implies that, inside a neighbourhood
Uv of the vertex v, the functions {fσ/ σ ∈ Fv} can be used to define a coordinate
system for Γd. More precisely, given a vertex v ∈ V , define
ψv : Uv −→ RFv ≡ Rd
q 7−→ (ψqσ(q))σ∈Fv := (fσ(q))σ∈Fv , (2.1)
where RFv := {(xσ)σ∈Fv/ xσ ∈ R}. The restriction of ψv to N˜v := Uv ∩ Γd is a
local coordinate system for the polytope, that sends the vertex v to the origin and
every face σ to the hyperplane {xσ = 0}. This restriction, denoted by ψv, is called
the local v−coordinate system of Γd. Shrinking the neighbourhoods N˜v, for the
different vertices v, we can make them disjoint if needed, just making smaller the
neighbourhoods Uv. We assume also that [0, 1]d ⊂ ψv(N˜v). The only thing we have
to do, if this is not the case, is multiply each defining function by a positive factor.
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Definition 2.7. Set Nv := ψ−1v ([0, 1]d). Then, {(Nv, ψv)/ v ∈ V } defines a pairwise
disjoint coordinate system, called the vertex coordinates of Γd.
Example 2.8. The n− 1 simplex, defined by
∆n−1 =
{
x ∈ Rn/
n∑
i=1
xi = 1, xj ≥ 0, for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
,
is a n−dimensional polytope. Its vertexes are e1, . . . , en, the elements of the canon-
ical basis of Rn. This polytope is an example of what is called canonical represen-
tation in [1]. Thus, its defining family is given by fi(x) = xi.
Figure 2.2: Simplexes ∆2 and ∆3 with its vertexes labelled.
Example 2.9. The square [0, 1]2 is a 2−polytope. The defining family {fi}i∈I , fi :
R2 → R, I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, for this polytope is given by:
f1(x, y) = y
f2(x, y) = 1− x
f3(x, y) = 1− y
f4(x, y) = x
See figure 2.3 to see the labels of the edges.
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Let us compute, for this example, the coordinate system ψv. Let us call vi,j the
vertex between σi and σj and Uvi,j a neighbourhood of that vertex. Then, by the
definition of coordinate system (2.1), we have:
ψv1,2(x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) = (y, 1− x), for (x, y) ∈ Uv1,2 ,
ψv2,3(x, y) = (f2(x, y), f3(x, y)) = (1− x, 1− y), for (x, y) ∈ Uv2,3 ,
ψv3,4(x, y) = (f3(x, y), f4(x, y)) = (1− y, x), for (x, y) ∈ Uv3,4 ,
ψv4,1(x, y) = (f4(x, y), f1(x, y)) = (x, y), for (x, y) ∈ Uv4,1 .
Figure 2.3: The square [0, 1]2.
2.2 Vector fields on polytopes
Given Γd a simple polytope, we are going to introduce some notation:
Notation 3. Denote by:
• Cω(Γd) the space of functions defined on Γd that can be extended analytically
to a neighbourhood of Γd.
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• Xω(Γd) the space of vector fields X on Γd that can be extended analytically
to a neighbourhood of Γd and that are tangent to each r−dimensional face of
the polytope Γd, with 0 ≤ r < d.
In this method, analyticity is assumed just for simplicity and because the vec-
tor fields obtained by the models of the evolutionary game theory are all analytic.
However, the following results can be extended to smooth vector fields.
Now, take any X ∈ Xω(Γd). For each σ ∈ F , we have that dfσ(X) = 0 in the face
σ = {q ∈ Γd/ fσ(q) = 0}1. Then, or dfσ(X) ≡ 0 or else dfσ(X) = fσHσ, for some
non identically zero function Hσ ∈ Cω(Γd).
In this last case, the vector field X is called nondegenerate when, for all faces
σ ∈ F , the function Hσ is non identically zero on σ.
Given v ∈ V a vertex of the polytope Γd, TvΓd denotes the linear space of
tangent vectors to Γd at v.
Note that, for every corner (v, γ, σ) there is a unique vector e(v,σ) parallel to γ
such that (dfσ)v(e(v,σ)) = 1. For X ∈ Xω(Γd) the vectors e(v,σ) are eigenvectors
of the derivative (DX)v. Then, Hσ(v) is the eigenvalue associated to e(v,σ) and is
given by:
Hσ(v) = (dfσ)v(DX)v(e(v,σ)).
Now, we define a concept which will be very important through this chapter.
Definition 2.10. Given a vector field X ∈ Xω(Γd), the skeleton character of X is
defined by χ = (χvσ)(v,σ)∈V×F , where
χvσ :=

−Hσ(v), if σ ∈ Fv,
0, otherwise.
Polymatrix skeleton
Now, our aim is to obtain explicit expressions for the skeleton character of the vector
field XA associated to the polymatrix replicator given in (1.8). We first note that
XA ∈ Xω(Γn).
1This means that (dfσ)p(X(p)) = 0, for all p ∈ Γd such that f(p) = 0.
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Before continuing, we introduce some needed notation:
Notation 4. Consider the prism
Γn := ∆
n1−1 ×∆n2−1 × . . .×∆np−1 ⊂ Rn,
which is a simple (n − p)−dimensional polytope. Set d = n − p. The defining
functions of Γn are
fi : E
d −→ R
x 7−→ fi(x) = xi,
with i ∈ α and α = 1, . . . , p.
We will write Vn = V (Γn), En = E(Γn), Fn = F (Γn) and Fn,v = Fv(Γn) to
denote the set of vertices, edges, faces and faces containing the vertex v, of Γn,
respectively.
Γn has exactly
∏p
j=1 nj vertices,
Vn = {ei1 + . . .+ eip/ iα ∈ α for α = 1, . . . , p},
where the vectors eiα stand for the canonical basis of Rn.
We label this vertexes in the set defined as:
J(n) := I1(n)× . . .× Ip(n),
where Iα(n) := [n1 + . . . + nα−1 + 1, n1 + . . . + nα], for α ∈ {2, . . . , p} and, by
convention, I1(n) = [1, n1]. With this notation, we have that j ∈ α if and only if
j ∈ Iα(n). Each label (j1, . . . , jp) ∈ J(n) determines the vertex
vj1,...,jp := ej1 + . . .+ ejp .
This polytope has also exactly n faces:
Fn = {σ1, . . . , σn},
with σi := Γn ∩ {xi = 0}, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
For each vertex v = ei1 + . . .+ eip , the set of faces containing v is:
Fn,v = { σi/ i ∈ α, i 6= iα, α = 1, . . . , p }.
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Now, let us fix a face i ∈ Fn,v. (1.9) can be rewritten as
x˙i = xi
(Ax)i −∑
k∈α
n∑
j=1
akjxkxj
 , i ∈ α, α = 1, . . . , p. (2.2)
If we consider the Taylor expansion in the variable xi and around zero of the
right hand side in (2.2), we have
x˙i = A1xi +A2x
2
i +A3x
3
i ,
where each coefficientAl is a polynomial on the variables xk with j 6= i. If α ∈ {1, . . . , p}
denotes the group in which i is contained, then we get:
A1 =
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
aijxj −
∑
k∈α\{i}
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
akjxkxj ,
A2 = aii −
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
aijxj −
∑
k∈α\{i}
akixk
and
A3 = −aii.
The next result, whose proof can be found in [1] or [18] gives us the expression
for the character of the vector field associated to the polymatrix replicator (2.2):
Proposition 2.11. Given the polymatrix game (n,A) as in Definition 1.26 and let
XA be the vector field associated to a polymatrix replicator (2.2) defined on Γn, we
have
XA is regular ⇐⇒ A1 does not vanish identically on Γn.
Furthermore, wheneverXA is regular, for every vertex v ∈ Vn with label (j1, . . . , jp),
then the skeleton character of XA is the family χ = (χvi ) given by
∑p
β=1(ajαjβ − aijβ ) if σi ∈ Fn,v,
0 otherwise.
(2.3)
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2.3 Rescaling coordinates
Given a vector field X in the polytope Γd, our aim here is to obtain from the original
vector field, another vector field which is piecewise-constant and whose behaviour
gives us information about the behaviour of X.
Our purpose now is to introduce a family of rescaling coordinates ΨXv,ε around
each vertex v of the polytope, which depend on a rescaling parameter ε > 0. That
will create a constant vector field from our original field, which is defined in the
polytope. We need first to define what we call sector.
Definition 2.12. Given a vertex v ∈ V , the sector at v is defined to be
Πv = {(uσ)σ∈F ∈ RF+/ uσ = 0, ∀σ /∈ Fv}
Definition 2.13. Given a vector field X ∈ Xω(Γd), a vertex v and ε > 0, define the
rescaling v−coordinate by:
ΨXv,ε : Nv \ ∂Γd −→ Πv
q 7−→ y :=

−ε2log(ψσv (q)) if σ ∈ Fv
0 if σ /∈ Fv,
being ψv the v−coordinate system defined earlier (see (2.1)). It results:
q 7−→ y :=

−ε2log(fσ(q)) if σ ∈ Fv
0 if σ /∈ Fv,
Remark 2.14. Notice that we have the following identifications:
Πv ≡ RFd+ ≡ Rd+.
Remember that the elements of Πv are (uσ)σ∈F ∈ RF+, satisfying certain condition.
Remember also that d = |F |.
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2.4 Dual cone of a polytope
We are going to introduce now the concept of dual cone of a polytope, which is the
natural place where the rescaled vector field, obtained in the last section, lays.
We will have a first approach to this object via geometrical interpretation for,
then, giving an algebraic definition that will be more suitable for the following theory.
Let Γd be a simple polytope and let Γ∗ be its dual polytope, that is, the one
obtained associating each vertex of Γd with faces in Γ∗ and, in general, the r−faces
of Γd with the (d− r)−faces in Γ∗.
First, let us introduce a geometrical definition of the dual cone.
Take any point O outside of the hyperplane generated by Γ∗. The dual cone of
the polytope Γd is defined by
C∗(Γd) := {O + λv/ v ∈ ∂Γ∗},
that is, the cone with origin O and passing through ∂Γ∗.
Figure 2.4: Dual cone of the polytope Γd = ∆2.
Given any face σ in Γd and let σ∗ denote its dual face in Γ∗, we say that Πσ = {O + λv /v ∈ σ∗}
is a face of the dual cone.
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Now, we give an alternative algebraic definition, embedding the dual cone of
Γd into the euclidean space RF . This approach will be more useful for the analytic
treatment. Recall that, for a vertex v ∈ V , the sector Πv is defined as
Πv := {(xσ)σ∈F ∈ RF+/ xσ = 0, ∀σ /∈ Fv}.
Then, we define:
Definition 2.15. The dual cone of Γd is defined as
C∗(Γd) =
⋃
v∈V
Πv.
Looking at Figure 2.4, one can easily understand geometrically this concept.
This algebraic definition is of particular interest, noting that the constant vector field
we created via the rescaling coordinate lives on the dual cone.
We can extend the definition of sector from vertices to (d − r)−faces of Γd to
obtain:
Definition 2.16. Given 0 ≤ r ≤ d and let ρ ∈ Kd−r(Γ) be a (d− r)−face of Γd. The
set
Πρ := {(xσ)σ∈F ∈ RF+/ xσ = 0, if ρ 6⊂ σ}
is called r−dimensional face of C∗(Γd). The r−dimensional skeleton of the dual
cone is defined as
C∗r (Γd) :=
⋃
{Πρ/ ρ ∈ Kd−r(Γd)}.
Duality plays an important role in this part, as it can be seen in the next remark.
Remark 2.17. By duality, we have the following:
a) If σ is an r−dimensional face of ∂Γd, then the face Πσ of the dual cone C∗(Γd)
is a (d − r)−dimensional sector. Also, the dual face of σ, σ∗, has dimension
d− 1− r.
b) Given faces ρ and σ of Γd, then ρ ⊂ σ ⇔ Πσ ⊂ Πρ.
c) Given faces ρ and σ of Γd, then Πρ ∩Πσ = Πρ∩σ.
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Skeleton coordinate system
Now, we introduce the skeleton coordinate system on Γd in the following way:
Definition 2.18. Let W := {x ∈ RF / 0 ≤ xσ ≤ 1 for all σ ∈ F}. Then, the skeleton
coordinate system on Γd is defined to be the map
ψ : Γd −→W
q 7−→ ψ(q) := (ψσ(q))σ∈F ,
where ψσ(q) := min{1, fσ(q)}.
Notation 5. We will denote the element of W whose all components are equal to 1
as 1 = (1, . . . , 1).
Definition 2.19. Given a face σ ∈ F , define
Nσ := {q ∈ Γd/ fσ(q) ≤ 1}.
Observe that ψ(q) = 1 when q /∈ ∪σ∈FNσ.
Definition 2.20. Given a vector field X ∈ Xω(Γd) and ε > 0, the ε−rescaling
Γd−coordinate for X is the map:
ΨXε : Γ
d \ ∂Γd −→ C∗(Γd)
q 7−→ ΨXε (q) :=
(−ε2 log(ψσ(q)))σ∈F ,
where ψσ is given in Definition 2.18.
Remark 2.21. Note that the rescaling v−coordinate ΨXv,ε, given in Definition 2.13
is just the composition of ΨXε , restricted to Nv, with the orthogonal projection from
RF to Πv.
2.5 Skeleton vector fields
Our aim now is to introduce and characterize vector fields on the dual cone. Via the
rescaling coordinates, every vector field X ∈ Xω(Γd) yields a piecewise constant
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vector field, which lives on the dual cone C∗(Γd). This vector field will be referred to
as the skeleton vector field of X.
More precisely,
Definition 2.22. A skeleton vector field on C∗(Γd) is a family χ = (χv)v∈V of vectors
in RF such that each component χv is tangent to the face Πv of the dual cone, for
all v ∈ F .
The first example of skeleton vector field is already known. Given X ∈ Xω(Γd),
recall the concept of skeleton character of X, (see Definition 2.10). The family
χ = (χv)v∈V obtained in this concept is a skeleton vector field. We will refer to this
family as the skeleton vector field of X.
Now, we are going to study the piecewise constant flows generated by skeleton
vector fields. With this idea in mind, we classify vertexes and edges of Γd with
respect to χ. Although this definitions may seem at first strange, they are related
with how the original fieldX behaves with the vertex or edge of the original polytope,
respectively.
Definition 2.23. Given χ a skeleton vector field and a vertex v, we say that v is:
(1) χ−repelling if −χv ∈ Πv.
(2) χ−attractive if χv ∈ Πv.
(3) of saddle type in other case.
Remark 2.24. If χ is the skeleton vector field of X ∈ Xω(Γd), then a vertex v ∈ V
is χ−repelling or χ−attractive if and only if v is a repelling or attractive singularity of
the field X, respectively. This fact can be explained with the v− rescaling coordinate
system (see Definition 2.13).
Definition 2.25. Consider now an edge γ ∈ E with end corners (v, σ) and (v′, σ′).
The edge γ is called χ−defined if χvσχv
′
σ′ 6= 0 or χvσ = χv
′
σ′ = 0.
When γ is a χ−defined edge, we also say that γ is
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(1) a flowing edge if χvσχv
′
σ′ < 0.
(2) an attracting edge if χvσ < 0 and χv
′
σ′ < 0.
(3) a repelling edge if χvσ > 0 and χv
′
σ′ > 0.
(4) a neutral edge if χvσ = χv
′
σ′ = 0.
In the following, we shall focus our attention in flowing edges. Assume γ is a
flowing edge such that χvσ < 0 and χv
′
σ′ > 0. We will indicate this by v
γ−−→ v′. The
vertexes v and v′ are called, respectively, the source and target of γ. We will write
v = s(γ) and v′ = t(γ).
Figure 2.5: γ1 is a neutral edge Figure 2.6: γ1 is a flowing edge
Figure 2.7: γ1 is an attracting edge Figure 2.8: γ1 is an repelling edge
Definition 2.26. The skeleton χ is called regular when all edges σ ∈ E are χ−defined.
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From now on, we will assume that the skeleton vector fields which we are work-
ing with are all regular.
Let Eχ be the set of all flowing edges and recall that V is the vertex set of Γd.
The directed graphGχ given byGχ = (V,Eχ) gives us information about the existing
flowing edges.
Definition 2.27. Given an interval I ⊂ R, a continuous piecewise affine function
c : I → C∗(Γd) such that:
(1) c˙(t) = χv if c(t) is interior to some sector Πv, with v ∈ V ,
(2) the set {t ∈ I /c(t) ∈ C∗d−1(Γd)} is finite or countable,
is called an orbit of χ.
Consider one vertex v ∈ V and two flowing edges v0 γ−−→ v and v γ
′
−−→ v′. Then,
there exists only one face σ′ such that (v, γ′, σ′) is a corner of Γd, i.e., such that
γ ⊂ γ′ and γ′ ∩ σ′ = {v}.
Let us write down explicitly the sector defined in Definition 2.16, but for an edge
γ:
Πγ = {(xσ)σ∈F ∈ RF+/ xσ = 0, if γ 6⊂ σ}.
It will be key in the next definition, which will be related to the orbits of χ in
Proposition 2.29.
Definition 2.28. Given v ∈ V and two flowing edges v0 γ−−→ v and v γ
′
−−→ v′, we
define the sector Πγ,γ′ = Π
χ
γ,γ′ as
Πγ,γ′ :=
{
x ∈ int(Πγ)/ xσ − χ
v
σ
χvσ′
xσ′ > 0, σ ∈ Fv, σ 6= σ′
}
and the linear map Lγ,γ′ = L
χ
γ,γ′ by
Lγ,γ′ : Πγ,γ′ −→ RF+
x 7−→
(
xσ − χ
v
σ
χvσ′
xσ′
)
σ∈F
.
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This map can be represented by the matrix
Mγ,γ′ =
(
δσ,σ′′ − χ
v
σ
χvσ′
δσ′σ′′
)
σ,σ′′∈F
,
where δσ,σ′′ is the Kronecker delta.
The following result relates the orbits of χ with the previous definition:
Proposition 2.29. Given v ∈ V and the flowing edges v0 γ−−→ v and v γ
′
−−→ v′,
the sector Πγ,γ′ is the set of points x ∈ int(Πγ) which are connected to the point
x′ = Lγ,γ′(x) ∈ int(Πγ′) by the orbit segment {c(t) = x+ tχv/ t ≥ 0, c(t) ∈ Πv}.
We can also consider the same definitions for the skeleton vector field −χ. We
have:
Remark 2.30. The linear map Lχγ,γ′ takes the sector Π
χ
γ,γ′ to Π
−χ
γ′,γ and L
−χ
γ′,γ takes
Π−χγ′,γ to Π
χ
γ,γ′ . The map L
−χ
γ′,γ is the inverse of L
χ
γ,γ′
The next remark tells us that saddle type nodes are the ones with the most
interesting behaviour and also why we consider the only interior of the sectors Πγ .
Remark 2.31. Consider two corners of the polytope, (v, γ′, σ′) and (v, γ′′, σ′′) around
a vertex v. In the case that v is χ−attractive or χ−repelling it is not possible to
connect points in Πγ′ with points in Πγ′′ by a parallel line to the constant vector χv.
Furthermore, in such a case, the points from the boundary of Πγ′ are on the
intersection of more than two sectors Πv, so, for such points, we cannot expect to
have a unique orbit.
We shall not consider this type of orbits through this work.
Now, the Poincaré map associated to the flow of χ is introduced. First, consider
the union of sectors Πχγ,γ′ for which the orbit can be constructed, denoted by
Πχ =
⋃
{Πγ,γ′/ t(γ) = s(γ′) with (γ, γ′) ∈ Eχ × Eχ} ⊂ C∗d−1(Γd).
Definition 2.32. The skeleton Poincaré map associated to χ is given by:
piχ : Πχ −→ C∗d−1(Γd)
x 7−→ piχ(x) := Lγ,γ′(x), when x ∈ Πγ,γ′ .
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We shall write pi = piχ when the skeleton vector field χ is clear from the context.
By its definition and by Remark 2.30 it is clear that the Poincaré map associated
to −χ, pi−χ, is the inverse of piχ.
Definition 2.33. We say that a point x ∈ Πχ has finite forward orbit if for some n ∈ N
we have that (piχ)i(u) ∈ Πχ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and (piχ)n(u) /∈ Πχ. In a similar
way, we say that a point x ∈ Π−χ has finite backward orbit if for some n ∈ N we
have that (pi−χ)i(u) ∈ Π−χ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and (pi−χ)n(u) /∈ Π−χ.
Otherwise, when for all n ∈ N, (piχ)n(u) ∈ Πχ, then we say that x has infinite
forward orbit and, when for all n ∈ N, (pi−χ)n(u) /∈ Π−χ, then x has infinite backward
orbit.
Definition 2.34. The maximal invariant sets are defined by
Λ+(χ) =
⋂
n≥0
(piχ)−n(Πχ)
Λ−(χ) =
⋂
n≥0
(piχ)−n(Π−χ).
This sets are made of by, respectively, the points in C∗d−1(Γd) with infinite forward
orbit and infinite backward orbit. The set defined by
Λ0(χ) = Λ+(χ) ∩ Λ−(χ)
consist of points with infinite backward and forward orbit.
Definition 2.35. A sequence of edges ξ = (γ0, . . . , γm) is called χ−path when ξ is
a path of the directed graph Gχ, that is:
(1) γj ∈ Eχ, for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}.
(2) t(γj−1) = s(γj), for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
We say that ξ is an χ−cycle when the path ξ is a cycle of Gχ, that is, when γ0 = γm.
The integer m is the length of the path ξ.
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Definition 2.36. An orbit segment for the Poincaré map piχ is a finite sequence
x = (x0, x1, . . . , xm), with xj ∈ Πχ and xj = pi(xj−1) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The only χ−path ξ = (γ0, . . . , γm) for which xj ∈ Πγj−1,γj , for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is
called itinerary of x.
We remark that, by definition, all the edges of an itinerary must be flowing edges.
Now, we will consider Poincaré maps along χ−paths:
Definition 2.37. Given a χ−path ξ = (γ0, . . . , γm), define the sector Πξ as:
Πξ =
{
x ∈ int(Πγ0)/ pij(x) ∈ int(Πγj ), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
}
.
The skeleton Poincaré map of χ along ξ is defined as the following composition:
piξ : Πξ −→ Πγm
x 7−→ piξ(x) := Lγm−1,γm ◦ . . . ◦ Lγ0,γ1(x)
The sector Πξ can be rewritten as:
Πξ = int(Πγ0) ∩
m⋂
j=1
(Lγj−1,γj ◦ . . . ◦ Lγ0,γ1)−1
(
int(Πγj )
)
.
Remark 2.38. (1) Given a χ−path of length one, ξ = (γ, γ′), then Πχ = Πγ,γ′ .
(2) Given two χ−paths, ξ, ξ′, if ξ 6= ξ′, then Πξ ∩Πξ′ = ∅.
(3) Given ξ′, ξ′′ two χ−paths such that the ending edge of ξ′ coincide with the
starting edge of ξ′′, then we can construct a new path ξ resulting of the con-
catenation of ξ′and ξ′′ and such that piξ = piξ′′ ◦ piξ′ .
Now we will introduce the called structural sets and the Poincaré maps associ-
ated to this sets.
Definition 2.39. A non-empty set of flowing edges S ⊂ Eχ is called structural set
for χ if:
(1) Any possible χ−cycle contains at least one edge from S.
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(2) If there exists another set S′ satisfying (1), then S ⊂ S′.
In general, more than one structural set for χ can exist, that is, S does not have
to be unique.
Definition 2.40. A χ−path ξ = (γ0, . . . , γm) is called a branch of the structural set
S or, shortly, S−branch, if:
(1) γ0, γm ∈ S.
(2) γj /∈ S, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
The set of all S−branches will be denoted by BS(χ).
Definition 2.41. Define the sector ΠS =
⋃
ξ∈BS(χ) Πξ. The S−Poincaré map is
defined as
piS : ΠS −→ ΠS
u 7−→ piS(u) := piξ(u), when u ∈ Πξ.
Next, sufficient conditions for the dynamics of piS to be non-trivial are given:
Proposition 2.42. Let X ∈ Xω(Γd) a vector field with associated skeleton vector
field χ and with structural set S ⊂ Eχ. If the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) χ is regular,
(2) χ has no attracting or repelling edges,
(3) all vertices are of saddle type,
then, the set Λ0(χ) ∩ ΠS has full (d − 1)−Lebesgue2 measure in
⋃
γ∈S Πγ . That is,
the complementary of Λ0(χ)∩ΠS in
⋃
γ∈S Πγ has zero (d− 1)−Lebesgue measure.
2When we write (d−1)−Lebesgue measure we emphasize the fact that Λ0(χ)∩ΠS has dimension
d− 1
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Example 2.43. Coming back to the polymatrix game given in Example 1.33, let us
illustrate with it some of the concepts introduced in this section. We denote by XA
the field generated by the polymatrix replicator derived of ((5), A) and χ denotes
its skeleton vector field. Let us label the vertices of Γ(5) = ∆4 by i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} to
indicate the vertex ei, from the canonical basis of R5. Also, represent by γ = (i, j)
the edge going from vertex i to vertex j. We shall notate this edges in the following
way:
γ1 = (1, 2) γ2 = (3, 1) γ3 = (1, 4) γ4 = (5, 1) γ5 = (2, 3)
γ6 = (2, 4) γ7 = (2, 5) γ8 = (3, 4) γ9 = (3, 5) γ10 = (4, 5).
In this case, not all edges are flowing. More precisely, edges γ6, γ7 and γ9 are
neutral edges.
The graph associated to the skeleton vector field χ is represented in figure 2.9,
where we have also represented the structural set S = {γ1, γ4}.
The S−branches of χ are given by ξ1, . . . , ξ5, with
ξ1 = (γ1, γ5, γ2, γ1), ξ2 = (γ1, γ5, γ8, γ10, γ1)
ξ3 = (γ1, γ5, γ2, γ3, γ10, γ4), ξ4 = (γ4, γ1), ξ5 = (γ4, γ3, γ10, γ4)
Figure 2.9: The oriented graph for χ. The structural set S is represented in red.
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2.6 Asymptotic Poincaré maps
Now, we will introduce the Poincaré maps associated to vector fields X ∈ Xω(Γd).
Recall that, by Definition 2.26, a skeleton vector field χ is regular if all edges
are χ−defined. We will define what we understand for regular vector fields in Γd:
Definition 2.44. A vector field X ∈ Xω(Γd) is called regular when its associated
vector field χ is regular, and, furthermore:
(1) For all flowing edges γ, X has no singularities in int(γ).
(2) X vanishes along every neutral edge.
In the sequel, we will restrict ourselves to regular vector fields X ∈ Xω(Γd).
Now, given any corner (v, γ, σ) ∈ C, define:
Σv,γ =
(
ΨXv,ε
)−1
(Πγ) .
Σv,γ is a cross section, transversal to the field X and it intersects γ at a single
point, denoted by qv,γ . Note that, as v ∈ γ, then, by Remark 2.17, Πγ ⊂ Πv. Recall
that the function ΨXv,ε was defined in Definition 2.13. It has as target space the
sector Πv. So, the section Σv,γ ⊂ Nv \ ∂Γd is well defined.
We use this notation:
Notation 6. Let us denote by ϕtX(x) the flow associated to the vector field X ∈
Xω(Γd).
Now, take two vertexes v, v′ ∈ V and a flowing edge v γ
′
−−→ v′. Let us denote by
Dγ′ the points from x ∈ int(Σv,γ′) such that the forward orbit of X, that is, the set
{ϕtX(x)/ t ≥ 0}, has a first intersection, in a transversal way, with Σv′,γ′ . Then we
define:
Definition 2.45. Let τ(x) = min{t > 0/ ϕtX(x) ∈ Σv′,γ′} be the first time for which
the flow of X intersects Σv′,γ′ transversally. Then, the partial Poincaré map Pγ′ is
given by:
Pγ′ : Dγ′ ⊂ int(Σv,γ′) −→ int(Σv′,γ′)
x 7−→ Pγ′(x) = ϕτ(x)X (x).
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Analogously, given vertexes v0, v, v′ ∈ V and flowing edges v0 γ−−→ v and v γ
′
−−→
v′, let Dγ,γ′ be the set of points x ∈ int(Σv,γ) such that the {ϕtX(x)/ t ≥ 0}, has a
first intersection, in a transversal way, with Σv,γ′ . Define:
Definition 2.46. Let τ(x) = min{t > 0/ ϕtX(x) ∈ Σv,γ′} be the first time for which
the flow of X intersects Σv,γ′ transversally. Then, the partial Poincaré map Pγ,γ′ is
given by:
Pγ,γ′ : Dγ,γ′ ⊂ int(Σv,γ) −→ int(Σv,γ′)
x 7−→ Pγ,γ′(x) = ϕτ(x)X (x).
Definition 2.47. Given a χ−path ξ = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γm),the Poincaré map of X along
ξ is defined by the composition
Pξ = (Pγm ◦ Pγm−1,γm) ◦ . . . ◦ (Pγ1 ◦ Pγ0,γ1).
The domain of this map is denoted by Dξ.
Remark 2.48. Given a structural set S ⊂ Eχ and two S−branches ξ 6= ξ′, then
Dξ ∩Dξ′ = ∅.
For a given path ξ, the asymptotic behaviour of the Poincaré map Pξ along ξ
is given by the corresponding Poincaré map piξ of the skeleton vector field χ. To
make more precise what we understand for asymptotic behaviour, we introduce the
following concept:
Definition 2.49. Consider a family of functions, depending on a parameter ε > 0,
Fε : Uε → Uε. Let F be a function F : U → U and assume Uε and U are linear
spaces. We say that Fε tends to F , as ε tends to zero, in the Ck topology, and we
write lim
ε→0+
Fε = F , when the following conditions are met:
(1) Domain convergence: for every K ⊂ U compact subset, we have that K ⊂ Uε,
for every ε > 0 small enough.
(2) Uniform convergence on compact sets:
lim
ε→0+
max
0≤i≤k
sup
u∈K
∣∣Di [Fε(u)− F (u)]∣∣ = 0.
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We say that the convergence holds in the C∞ topology if it holds in the Ck topology,
for all k ≥ 1.
For an edge γ ∈ E, we define the sub-domain Πγ(ε) of Πγ as
Πγ(ε) = {y ∈ Πv/ yσ ≥ ε, for all σ ∈ F such that γ ⊂ σ}.
The next result, whose proof can be seen in [1], tells us that the asymptotic
behaviour of the Poincaré map Pξ is governed by piξ, as we mentioned earlier.
Proposition 2.50. Given a χ−path ξ = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γm) with v0 = s(γ0) and vm = s(γm)
and let Uεξ be the domain of the map F εξ : Πγ0(ε) → Πγm(ε), defined by the com-
position: F εξ := Ψ
X
vm,ε ◦ Pξ ◦ (ΨXv0,ε)−1. Then we have the following limit in the Ck
topology:
lim
ε→0+
(F εξ ) = piξ.
Definition 2.51. Given X ∈ Xω(Γd) a regular vector field with structural set S ⊂ Eχ,
we define the section ΣS = ∪γ∈SΣγ and the domain DS = ∪ξ∈BS(χ)Dξ. The
S−Poincaré map associated to X is defined as
PS : DS ⊂ ΣS −→ ΣS
p 7−→ PS(p) = Pξ(p), when x ∈ Dξ.
The following result can be obtained as a corollary of Proposition 2.50 (see [1]).
Proposition 2.52. Given X ∈ Xω(Γd) a regular vector field with associated skeleton
vector field χ and with structural set S ⊂ Eχ, the following limit in the CK topology
holds:
lim
ε→0+
ΨXε ◦ PS ◦ (ΨXε )−1 = piS .
2.7 Projective Poincaré maps
Let X ∈ Xω(Γd) be a regular vector field with skeleton χ and consider a χ−structural
set S. As before, 1 ∈ RF+ is the vector whose all coordinates are equal to 1. We
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write
u¯ := 1 u =
∑
σ∈F
uσ.
Also, let G = Gχ = (V,Eχ) denote the directed graph of χ and let BS(χ) be the
set of all S−branches of G. Given a χ−path ξ = (γ1, . . . , γm) such that the cone Πξ
has non-empty interior, define the (d− 2)-simplex
∆χξ = {u ∈ int(Πξ)/ u¯ = 1}
and
∆χS =
⋃
ξ∈BS(χ)
∆χξ .
In an analogous way, define, for each edge γ ∈ Eχ
∆γ = {u ∈ int(Πγ)/ u¯ = 1}
and set
∆S =
⋃
γ∈S
∆γ .
Definition 2.53. For a χ−path ξ,= (γ1, . . . , γm), the projective Poincaré map along
ξ is defined as the map
pˆiξ : ∆
χ
ξ ⊂ ∆γ1 −→ ∆γm
u 7−→ pˆiξ(u) = piξ(u)
piξ(u)
The projective S−Poincaré map is the map
pˆiS : ∆
χ
S ⊂ ∆S −→ ∆S
u 7−→ pˆiS(u) = pˆiξ(u), for all u ∈ ∆χξ .
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Chapter 3
Dynamics of human decisions
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first two sections, we review the decision
model from [19], which is a 2 × 2 dimensional model. We briefly recall the results
appearing in the mentioned source according to pure and mixed strategies.
In the third section, we generalize this decision model to the case with n strate-
gies and k different individuals. We point out that the generalized model can be
written as a polymatrix equation and thus, the work presented in chapter 2 can be
used to study the asymptotic behaviour of the general k × n model. In the fourth
section we try to unify the notation from this model and from the polymatrix equation.
In the last section, we restrict to the model with dimension k × 2 and we extend
the definitions of the Nash domains from the 2×2 case. Further, we give necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria in all point for the
case k = 2. As a future work, we can extend this to k > 2.
3.1 The Yes-No decision model
Let us consider a population I consisting of two types of individuals T = {t1, t2}.
Let I1 = {1, ..., n1} be the number of individuals with type t1 and I2 = {1, ..., n2} the
number of individuals with type t2. Then we have I = I1 unionsq I2. Each individual i ∈ I
has to make one decision d ∈ D = {Y,N}1
1Alternative models consider an only individual with type tp which has to make np decisions.
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Before continuing, let us introduce some constants, which indicate the prefer-
ences of an individual i ∈ I making a decision d ∈ D.
Notation 7. γdp indicates how much a type tp individual likes or dislikes to make a
decision d.
βdpq indicates how much a type tp individual, whose decision is d, likes or dislikes
that a type tq individual makes the same decision.
β
d
pq indicates how much a type tp individual, whose decision is d, likes or dislikes
that a type tq individual makes the other decision.
Remark 3.1. The values γdp tell us the preferences of the individuals, that is, the
taste type of the individuals. On the other hand, the values βdpq and β
d
pq tell us with
whom the individuals want to share their decisions, that is, the crowding type of the
individuals.
We are going to describe the pure decisions of the individuals in terms of a
strategic map S : I → D, which associates to each individual i its decision S(i) = d.
Let us denote by S the space of all possible strategies S.
Definition 3.2. Given a strategy S ∈ S, we call strategic decision vector associated
to S to the vector (l1, l2) = (l1(S), l2(S)), where li is the number of individuals with
type t1 who make decision Y.
The set of all possible strategic decision vectors is
O = {0, 1, . . . , n1} × {0, 1, . . . , n2}
Notation 8. If d ∈ {Y,N} and i, j ∈ {1, 2}:
ωY1 = γ
Y
1 + β
Y
11(n1 − 1) + βY12n2,
ωN1 = γ
N
1 + β
N
11(n1 − 1) + βN12n2,
ωY2 = γ
Y
2 + β
Y
22(n2 − 1) + βY21n1,
ωN2 = γ
N
2 + β
N
22(n2 − 1) + βN21n1,
αdij = β
d
ij − β
d
ij .
The utility function of the individuals are given by the following expressions: If
the individual has type t1, then its utility is given by the function:
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U1 : D ×O −→ R
(Y ; (l1, l2)) 7−→ γY1 + βY11(l1 − 1) + βY12l2 + βY11(n1 − l1) + βY12(n2 − l2)
= ωY1 + α
Y
11(l1 − 1) + αY12l2
(N ; (l1, l2)) 7−→ γN1 + βN11(n1 − l1 − 1) + βN12(n2 − l2) + βN11l1 + βN12l2
= ωN1 + α
N
11(n1 − l1 − 1) + αY12(n2 − l2).
while the utility of the t2 individuals is given by:
U2 : D ×O −→ R
(Y ; (l1, l2)) 7−→ γY2 + βY22(l2 − 1) + βY21l1 + βY22(n2 − l2) + βY21(n1 − l1)
= ωY2 + α
Y
22(l2 − 1) + αY21l1
(N ; (l1, l2)) 7−→ γN2 + βN22(n2 − l2 − 1) + βN21(n1 − l1) + βN22l2 + βN21l1
= ωN2 + α
N
22(n2 − l2 − 1) + αY21(n1 − l1).
Thus, given a strategy S ∈ S, the utility of the individual i ∈ I, with type tp(i),
using the strategy S, is: Up(i)(S(i); l1(S), l2(S)), where p(i) ∈ {1, 2} means the type
of individual.
Definition 3.3. We set x = ωY1 −ωN1 to be the horizontal relative decision preference
of the individuals with type t1 and y = ωY2 − ωN2 to be the vertical relative decision
preference of the individuals with type t2. Also, set Aij = αYij + α
N
ij , i, j ∈ {1, 2} to
be the coordinates of the influence matrix.
We observe that the sign of x and y determine the preference of the individuals
to take one or another decision:
If x > 0, then individuals with t1 prefer to choose Y without taking into account
the influence of the others. If x = 0, the individuals with type t1 are indifferent to
decide Y or N without taking into account the influence of the others. If x < 0,
individuals with type t1 prefer to decide N, without taking into account the influence
of the others.
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On the other hand, Aij determines the influence of some individuals over others:
If Aij > 0, the individuals with type tj have a positive influence over the utility of the
individuals with type ti. If Aij = 0, the individuals with type tj do not affect the utility
of the individuals with type ti. If Aij < 0, the individuals with type tj have a negative
influence over the utility of the individuals with type ti.
3.1.1 Pure strategies
Now we will introduce here the concept of Nash equilibria. Two types of equilibria
are considered: cohesive and disparate. We say that one strategy is cohesive when
individuals of the same type always prefer to make the same decisions. Otherwise,
the strategy is called disparate.
Nash equilibria for pure strategies is defined as follows:
Definition 3.4. A strategy S∗ : I → D is a pure Nash equilibria if for all individual
i ∈ I and all strategy S ∈ S, such that S∗(j) = S(j) for j ∈ I \ {i}, we have that
Ui(S
∗) ≥ Ui(S).
That is, if only one individual change its strategy from a Nash equilibria, then he
obtains less payoff.
The following concept will also be important for our purpose:
Definition 3.5. We call Nash domain of a strategy S ∈ S to the set:
N(S) = {(x, y) ∈ R2/S is a Nash equilibria}.
Cohesive strategies
We observe that only four cohesive strategies are possible:
(Y, Y ) strategy, which happens when all individuals make the decision Y.
(Y,N) strategy, if all individuals with type t1 make the decision Y and all individ-
uals with type t2 make the decision N.
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(N,Y ) strategy, when all individuals with type t1 make the decision N and all
individuals with type t2 make the decision Y
(N,N) strategy, if all individuals make the decision N.
We will start with the (Y, Y ) strategy :
Proposition 3.6. Given the strategy (Y, Y ), its Nash domain is given by:
N(Y, Y ) = {(x, y) ∈ R2/x ≥ H(Y, Y ), y ≥ V (Y, Y )},
where H(Y, Y ) and V (Y, Y ) are, respectively, the horizontal and vertical strategic
thresholds for (Y, Y ) and are given by:
H(Y, Y ) = −αY11(n1 − 1)− αY12n2
V (Y, Y ) = −αY22(n2 − 1)− αY21n1
Proof. It follows directly from the Nash equilibrium definition.
Similar results are obtained for the rest of the cohesive strategies, as it is shown
on [19].
Disparate strategies
An (l1, l2) strategic set is the set of all pure strategies S ∈ S with l1(S) = l1 and
l2(S) = l2. An (l1, l2) cohesive strategic set is an (l1, l2) strategic set with l1 ∈ {0, n1}
and l2 ∈ {0, n2}. An (l1, l2) disparate strategic set is an (l1, l2) strategic set that is
not cohesive. We observe that a cohesive strategic set has a single strategy and a
disparate strategic set has more than one strategy. Since individuals with the same
type are identical, a strategy to be a Nash equilibrium depends only of the number
of individuals of each type that decide either Y or N, and not of the individual who is
making the decision.
Definition 3.7. An (l1, l2) pure Nash equilibrium set is an (l1, l2) strategic set whose
strategies are Nash equilibria. The pure Nash domain N(l1, l2) is the set of all pairs
(x, y) for which the (l1, l2) strategic set is a Nash equilibrium set.
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The (l1, l2) pure Nash equilibrium set is cohesive if l1 ∈ {0, n1} and l2 ∈ {0, n2}.
The (l1, l2) pure Nash equilibrium set is disparate if l1 /∈ {0, n1} or l2 /∈ {0, n2}.
Now we state two results whose proof follows directly from Nash equilibrium
definition and that can be found in [19].
Lemma 3.8. Let (l1, l2) be a Nash equilibrium.
(i) If A11 > 0, then l1 ∈ {0, n1}.
(ii) If A22 > 0, then l2 ∈ {0, n2}.
Furthermore, if A11 > 0 and A22 > 0, then (l1, l2) is cohesive.
Thus, if A11 > 0 and A22 > 0, then there are not disparate Nash equilibria.
Let C ∈ R2 be given by C = (H(N,N), V (N,N)). The disparate vector ~Z(l1, l2)
is defined by
~Z(l1, l2) = −l1(A11, A21)− l2(A12, A22).
Lemma 3.9. Let l1 ∈ {0, . . . , n1 − 1} and l2 ∈ {0, . . . , n2 − 1}.
(i) If A11 ≤ 0, then the disparate Nash domain N(l1, 0) is given by
N(l1, 0) = {C + ~Z(l1, 0) + (pA11, q) : p ∈ [0, 1]; q ∈ (−∞, 0]}.
and the disparate Nash domain N(l1, n2) is given by
N(l1, n2) = {C + ~Z(l1, n2) + (pA11, q) : p ∈ [0, 1]; q ∈ (0,+∞]}.
(ii) If A22 ≤ 0, then the disparate Nash domain N(0, l2) is given by
N(0, l2) = {C + ~Z(0, l2) + (p, qA22) : q ∈ [0, 1]; p ∈ (−∞, 0]}.
and the disparate Nash domain N(n1, l2) is given by
N(n1, l2) = {C + ~Z(n1, l2) + (p, qA22) : q ∈ [0, 1]; p ∈ (0,+∞]}.
(iii) If A11 ≤ 0 and A22 ≤ 0, then the disparate Nash domain N(l1, l2) is given by:
N(l1, l2) = {C + ~Z(l1, l2) + (pA11, qA22) : p, q ∈ [0, 1]}.
Thus, if A11 ≤ 0 and A22 ≤ 0, then for every (l1, l2) disparate strategic set there
are relative preferences for which (l1, l2) is a Nash equilibrium set.
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3.1.2 Mixed strategies
Now we will introduce mixed strategies and mixed Nash equilibria. The idea which
underlies here is to assign some probabilities to the decision making. Mixed strate-
gies are given by a function S : I → [0, 1] which associates to each individual i ∈ I1
its probability to decide Y , which is denoted by pi and to each individual in I2 its
probability to decide Y , denoted by qj . Thus, each individual i ∈ I decides N with
probability 1 − pi and each individual j ∈ I2 decides N with probability 1 − qj . It is
assumed that the decisions are made independently.
We will introduce here some more notation:
Notation 9. We denote:
P =
n1∑
i=1
pi and Pi = P − pi.
Q =
n2∑
j=1
qj and Qi = Q− qj .
Now we are going to define an analogous concept to the utility function for the
pure strategies case. This is the fitness function:
Definition 3.10. For every individual i ∈ I1, the Y -fitness function fY,1 is given by:
fY,1 : [0, 1]× [0, n1]× [0, n2] −→ R
(pi;P,Q) 7−→ ωY1 + αY11Pi + αY12Q
and the N -fitness function fN,1 is given by:
fN,1 : [0, 1]× [0, n1]× [0, n2] −→ R
(pi;P,Q) 7−→ ωN1 + αN11(n1 − 1− Pi) + αN12(n2 −Q).
For every individual j ∈ I2, the Y -fitness function fY,2 is given by:
fY,2 : [0, 1]× [0, n1]× [0, n2] −→ R
(qj ;P,Q) 7−→ ωY2 + αY22Qj + αY21P
56
FCUP
Dynamics and Pure Nash Equilibria in Human Decisions
and the N -fitness function fN,2 is given by:
fN,2 : [0, 1]× [0, n1]× [0, n2] −→ R
(qj ;P,Q) 7−→ ωN2 + αN22(n2 − 1−Qj) + αN21(n1 − P ).
Now we are going to introduce one concept that in [19] is referred as utility
function, but some authors call it average payoff or average utility.
We have the following result, whose proof can be seen in [19] and which gives
us one formula to compute more easily the utility functions:
Lemma 3.11. Let S : I → [0, 1] be a mixed strategy. For every individual i ∈ I1, its
utility function is given by:
U1 : [0, 1]× [0, n1]× [0, n2] −→ R
(pi;P,Q) 7−→ pi fY,1(pi;P,Q) + (1− pi) fN,1(pi;P,Q),
while for every individual j ∈ I2, its utility function is given by:
U2 : [0, 1]× [0, n1]× [0, n2] −→ R
(qj ;P,Q) 7−→ qj fY,2(qj ;P,Q) + (1− qj) fN,2(qj ;P,Q),
Definition 3.12. A strategy S∗ : I → [0, 1] is a mixed Nash equilibria if for all indi-
vidual i ∈ I and all strategy S ∈ S, such that S∗(j) = S(j) for j ∈ I \ {i}, we have
that
Ui(S
∗) ≥ Ui(S).
That is, if only one individual change its strategy from a Nash equilibria, then he
obtains less payoff.
3.1.3 Strategic sets
Definition 3.13. We call (l1, l2)-strategic pure set to the set of all strategies S ∈
S such that l1(S) = l1 and l2(S) = l2, i.e., the strategies for which there are l1
individuals of type t1 and l2 individuals of type t2 choosing Y .
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Definition 3.14. We call (l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) mixed strategy set to the set of all strate-
gies which satisfy:
i) l1 = #{i ∈ I1/pi = 1} and k1 = #{i ∈ I1/pi = p}.
ii) l2 = #{j ∈ I2/qj = 1} and k2 = #{j ∈ I2/qj = q}.
iii) n1 − (l1 + k1) = #{i ∈ I1/pi = 0} and n2 − (l2 + k2) = #{j ∈ I2/qj = 0}.
Remark 3.15. The following is derived from the two previous definitions:
1. The (l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) mixed strategy set consists of strategies for which there
are l1 individuals with type t1 and l2 individuals with type t2 choosing Y , n1 −
(l1 + k1) individuals with type t1 and n2 − (l2 + k2) individuals with type t2
choosing N and k1 individuals with type t1 and k2 individuals with type t2
choosing Y with probabilities p and q respectively.
2. If p, q ∈ {0, 1}, then the (l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) mixed strategy set coincides with the
(l1 + pk1, l2 + qk2) pure strategic set.
3. From 2. we deduce that, if k1 = k2 = 0, then the strategic (l1, 0, p; l2, 0, q) set
coincides with the pure strategic set (l1, l2).
We note that, because individuals from the same group are indistinguishable, if
a mixed strategy is contained in the (l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) mixed strategy set is a Nash
equilibrium, then all the strategies in that strategic set are also Nash equilibria.
We introduce now more notation, motivated by the previous remark, and which
will be useful in the following.
Notation 10. Given one strategy from the (l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) mixed strategy set, we
define:
v[1l] = (v1l1 , . . . , v
1l
l1 ), v[1m] = (v
1m
1 , . . . , v
1m
n1−(l1+k1)), v[1r] = (v
1r
1 , . . . , v
1r
k1)
v[2l] = (v2l1 , . . . , v
2l
l2 ), v[2m] = (v
2m
1 , . . . , v
2m
n2−(l2+k1)), v[2r] = (v
2r
1 , . . . , v
2r
k2)
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We define the vectors v[1] ∈ Rn1 , v[2] ∈ Rn2 and v ∈ Rn1+n2 by:
v[1] = (v[1l], v[1m], v[1r]), v[2] = (v[2l], v[2m], v[2r]) and v = (v[1], v[2]).
Let us now define V [1] and V [2] by:
V [1] =
l1∑
i=1
v1li +
n1−(l1+k1)∑
j=1
v1mj +
k1∑
k=1
v1rk ,
V [2] =
l2∑
i=1
v2li +
n2−(l2+k2)∑
j=1
v2mj +
k2∑
k=1
v2rk .
Remark 3.16. The vectors v[1l], v[2l] are formed by the probabilities of individuals
with type t1 and t2, respectively, that are choosing Y .
The vectors v[1m], v[2m] are formed by the probabilities of individuals with type
t1 and t2, respectively, that are choosing N .
The vectors v[1r], v[2r] are formed by the probabilities of individuals with type t1
and t2 that are choosing Y with probabilities p and q, respectively.
Always with the previous remark in mind, it is clear that v[1] corresponds to the
vector (p1, . . . , pn1) after applying (possibly) a permutation to its components. The
same holds for v[2] and the vector (q1, . . . , qn2).
Finally, V [1] and V [2] correspond to P and Q, respectively.
Remark 3.17. When k1 = k2 = 0, we have that v[1r] = ∅ and v[2r] = ∅, so v[1] =
(v[1l], v[1m]) and v[2] = (v[2l], v[2m]).
Now, we give the following definition:
Definition 3.18. The (l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) canonical strategy is any strategy from the
(l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) mixed strategy set, that is, one strategy which satisfies the follow-
ing conditions:
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n1 − (l1 + k1)} and k ∈ {1, . . . , k1},
v1li = 1, v
1m
j = 0 and v
1r
k = p.
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l2}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n2 − (l2 + k2)} and k ∈ {1, . . . , k2},
v2li = 1, v
2m
j = 0 and v
2r
k = q.
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3.2 The dynamics of the decisions
We will assume now that the frequencies of choosing Y , that is, the values pi and
qj , are changing with the time. Thus, the individuals can now change their decisions
with the time. This leads to dynamics in the decision making:
p˙i = pi
(
fY,1(pi;P,Q)− U1(pi;P,Q)
)
q˙j = qj
(
fY,2(qj ;P,Q)− U2(qj ;P,Q)
)
,
which can be rewritten as:
p˙i = pi(1− pi)
(
fY,1(pi;P,Q)− fN,1(pi;P,Q)
)
q˙j = qj(1− qj)
(
fY,2(qj ;P,Q)− fN,2(qj ;P,Q)
)
,
using the expressions for the utility functions. Now, using the expressions for the
fitness functions, we can write the dynamics as the following O.D.E.s system:
p˙i = pi(1− pi)
(
PiA11 +QA12 + x−H(N,N)
)
q˙j = qj(1− qj)
(
QjA22 + PA21 + y − V (N,N)
)
,
(3.1)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , n1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n2}.
We will denote this dynamics as S˙ = G(S;x, y), to emphasize the fact that the
strategies are changing with the time. Here, G : [0, 1]n1+n2 × R× R→ [0, 1]n1+n2 is
the vector field associated with (3.1).
Remark 3.19. We note that, as pi, qj ∈ [0, 1], for i ∈ {1, . . . , n1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n2},
then the system (3.1) has as phase space the n1 + n2 dimensional cube [0, 1]n1+n2 .
Also, we note that the faces of this cube (ie, points where at least one pi or qj vanish)
and, consequently, the cube itself are invariant by the flow generated by the system.
This suggests us that the work explained in chapter 2 can be applied to the system
(3.1).
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Definition 3.20. We say that a strategy S : I → [0, 1] is a dynamical equilibrium of
(3.1) if G(S;x, y) = 0, that is:
p˙i = pi(1− pi)
(
PiA11 +QA12 + x−H(N,N)
)
= 0
q˙j = qj(1− qj)
(
QjA22 + PA21 + y − V (N,N)
)
= 0,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n2}.
We can also consider the linearised system of (3.1), denoted by S˙ = DG(S;x, y),
where DG denotes the Jacobian matrix of G.
Definition 3.21. We say that an equilibrium strategy S is strongly stable if all the
eigenvalues of DG(S;x, y) have negative real parts. S is called strongly unstable if
DG(S;x, y) has at least one eigenvalue with positive real part.
Definition 3.22. We call equilibria domain E(l1k1, p; l2, k2, q) to the set of all pairs
(x, y) ∈ R2 for which the strategies contained in the (l1k1, p; l2, k2, q) strategic set
are equilibria of the dynamics.
Similarly, the strongly stable domain S(l1k1, p; l2, k2, q) is the set of all pairs
(x, y) ∈ R2 for which the strategies contained in the (l1k1, p; l2, k2, q) strategic set
are strongly stable equilibria of the dynamics.
The strongly unstable domain U(l1k1, p; l2, k2, q) is the set of all pairs (x, y) ∈ R2
for which the strategies contained in the (l1k1, p; l2, k2, q) strategic set are strongly
unstable equilibria of the dynamics.
Remark 3.23. We have the following chain of inclusions:
S(l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) ⊂ N(l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q) ⊂ E(l1, k1, p; l2, k2, q)
Using the Notation 10, the dynamics (3.1) can be written as:
v˙1si1 = v
1s
i1
(1− v1si1 )
(
(V [1]− v1si1 )A11 + V [2]A12 + x−H(N,N)
)
, i1 ∈ I1
v˙2si2 = v
2s
i2
(1− v2si2 )
(
(V [2]− v2si2 )A22 + V [2]A21 + y − V (N,N)
)
, i2 ∈ I2,
(3.2)
where s ∈ {l,m, r} and (x, y) ∈ R2.
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3.3 General decision model
Now we consider a more general scenario, consisting of the same game as ex-
plained in the previous sections, with the difference that now, we have a number nI
of individuals, each of which can decide between a number nD of decisions. The
starting point is the model introduced in [20]. We give the equations of the evolution
of strategy frequencies for that game and we give an alternative version for it. This
is new with respect to the mentioned source.
Two variants are considered in this work. The difference between them will lay on
the called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition. It consists of the
restriction of social interactions to those individuals who make the same decisions.
IIA condition is satisfied in the model presented in [20].
Let us denote by I = {n1, . . . , nI} the individuals of the population, who are
making one decision between the possible decisions D = {1, . . . , nD}. Associated
to the individuals, there is a strategy map, which associates to each individual the
decision she is making:
S : I −→ D
i 7−→ S(i) ≡ Si
We will note by S−1(Si) ⊂ I the individuals that make a decision Si.
Version with IIA condition The first variant considers that the IIA condition is
satisfied. We are here inspired in [20].
For this situation, the utility function for every individual results:
U : I ×D −→ R
(i, d) 7−→ u(i, d) = ωdi +
∑
j∈S−1(si)\{i}
αdij ,
where ωdi represents how much an individual i likes to make decision d and α
d
ij
indicates how much an individual i likes that an individual j share with her a decision
d. By pdi we will represent the probability of an individual i to choose the strategy d.
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We denote by
up(i, d) = ω
d
i +
∑
j∈S−1(si)\{i}
αdijp
d
j
the gain for an individual who is making a pure decision d. The average utility will
be denoted by
u¯(i) =
∑
d∈D
pdi up(i, d).
In this fashion, we arrive to the usual replicator equation:
p˙di
pdi
= up(i, d)− u¯(i).
Version without the IIA condition and with types In the second case we intro-
duce here, we assume that IIA condition is not satisfied. We use the same notation
as in the other case, but know, we introduce groups of individuals. Namely, the indi-
vidual set can be decomposed in n groups of individuals of type ti: I = It1∪ . . .∪Itk .
We denote by T the set of the possible groups, T = {t1, . . . , tk}.
The utility function here results:
U : I ×D −→ R
(i, d) 7−→ u(i, d) = ωdt +
∑
d′∈D
∑
t′∈T
t′ 6=t
αdd
′
tt′ l
d′
t′ , whenever i ∈ It,
where ld
′
t′ is the number of individuals from t
′ choosing d′and αdd′tt′ denotes the influ-
ence over an individual i ∈ It who makes decision d of another individual j ∈ It′
making decision d′. The fact that we do not consider the case t′ = t is in relation
with the hypothesis we made: the individuals of a certain type do not have effect
over the utility of individuals of the same type.
Introducing the notation:
P d
′
t′ =
∑
i∈It′
pd
′
i ,
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as before, we have that
up(i, d) = ω
d
t +
∑
d′∈D
∑
t′∈T
t′ 6=t
αdd
′
tt′ P
d′
t′ , whenever i ∈ It,
represents the gain for an individual who is making a pure decision d and
u¯(i) =
∑
d∈D
pdi up(i, d)
represents the average gain for that individual. The replicator equation we purpose
in this case is
p˙di
pdi
= up(i, d)− u¯(i).
Remark 3.24. This general model is contained in the polymatrix replicator model,
as ωdi =
∑
d′∈D ω
d
i p
d′
i , as
∑
d′∈D p
d′
i = 1. Then, the utility can be written as
u(i, d) =
∑
d′∈D
ωdi p
d′
i +
∑
d′∈D
k∑
j=1
j 6=i
αdd
′
ij p
d′
j ,
just as in the polymatrix equation.
Remark 3.25. Observe that the two following facts are satisfied:
•
∑
d∈D p
d
i = 1.
•
∑
d∈D p˙
d
i = 0.
3.4 The general model as a polymatrix replicator
Our aim here is to determine whether the general k×nmodel (without IIA condition),
that is, with K different types of individuals deciding between a set of n decisions,
presented in the last section is equivalent to the polymatrix replicator that we pre-
viously introduced. Observing carefully both models, we arrive to the conclusion
that, the general model will be equivalent to the polymatrix replicator as soon as we
make some restrictions.
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First of all, it seems reasonable to consider that the groups It, with t ∈ T are
formed only by one individual. In this situation, we have a bijection between individ-
uals and groups, that is, if i ∈ It, then we can relate i↔ t.
The Remark 3.24 is crucial in this discussion, as it implies that the term ωdt = 0
does not represent a problem, despite the polymatrix replicator does not have this
term.
The main difficulty we face here is the different notations adopted in both models.
We tried to make an effort in unifying this two different notations presenting a new
one.
Notation 11. Let us denote:
• ~Qi =
(
p˙
d1
i
p
d1
i
, . . . ,
p˙dni
pdni
)T
and ~Q =
(
~Q1, . . . , ~Qk
)T
.
• ~Pi =
(
pd1i , . . . , p
dn
i
)T
and ~P =
(
~P1, . . . , ~Pk
)T
.
• [~P Ti ] =
(
~P Ti , . . . ,
~P Ti
)T
and ~Qdli =
p˙
dl
i
p
dl
i
.
Let us now introduce the payoff matrix A, to make clear the equivalence with the
polymatrix replicator.
Let us notate
Aij =

αd1d1ij . . . α
d1dn
ij
...
...
αdnd1ij . . . α
dndn
ij
 = (αdldl′ij )l,l′∈{1,...,n},
Ai =
(
Ai1| . . . |Aik
)
and
A = (A1| . . . |Ak)T =

A11 . . . A1k
...
...
Ai1 . . . Aik
...
...
Ak1 . . . Akk

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We have in our case the restriction Aii = 0, as groups are formed by individuals
and thus, no possible interaction between members from the same group can occur.
With this notations, we can write the general model as:
~Qdli = (A
i ~P )dl + [
~P Ti ](A
i ~P ).
Remark 3.26. We observe that Aij = Tr(Aij) = αd1d1ij + . . .+ α
dndn
ij .
3.5 Pure Nash equilibria
Let us consider here the last equations on the case k × 2, which corresponds to
the situation where there are k individuals who can choose between two different
decisions, say Y and N . We assume through this section that we are under the IIA
condition. In our equation, this means that αdd
′
ij = 0, for all d
′ 6= d and all i, j. We
restrict ourselves to the case with two decisions, as we already have a knowledge of
the situation of Nash equilibria domains, as appears in [19]. Though the n decisions
case can be studied, it would require to think everything from the beginning.
Let (~P )i be the coordinate i of ~P .
Notation 12. Let
• ~ei = (|A1i|, . . . , |Aki|)
• ~ci = − (0, . . . , 0, |Aii|, 0, . . . , 0) = −|Aii|cˆi, where cˆi are the vectors from the
canonical basis of R2.
• ~Ei = (|A1i|, . . . , 0, . . . , |Aki|) = ~ei + ~ci.
• Hi = {(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Rk/ xi = 0}.
• Hi(~P ) = {(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xk)/ xi = (~P )i}, that is, the hyperplane
parallel to Hi passing through ~P .
Remark 3.27. Observe that ~Ej ∈ Hj and ~cj ⊥ Hj , for j ∈ {1, 2}.
66
FCUP
Dynamics and Pure Nash Equilibria in Human Decisions
Let Yi = {0, . . . , ni} and Zi = {0, ni}.
Let X = X1 × . . .×Xk, where Xi = Yi if Aii ≤ 0 and Xi = Zi if Aii > 0.
Definition 3.28. Assume Aii ≤ 0 and define the map
~Z : X1 × . . .×Xk −→ Rk
(l1, . . . , lk) 7−→ ~Z(l1, . . . , lk) =
k∑
i=1
li~ei
From now on, let us assume that Aij < 0, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Definition 3.29. Let ~` ∈ X. The ~` Nash domain N(~`) consists of all points x such
that ~` is a Nash strategy. The Nash domain N is the union of all ~` Nash domains,
that is, N = ∪~`∈XN(~`).
Our aim is to determine whether N = Rk.
Definition 3.30. The right upper corner from the Nash domain N(~0) is the point
CRU (~0) = (Ci)i∈{1,...,k}, where
Ci =
n∑
j=1
αNij − αNii .
Let us justify the expression of Ci. If we write the utility of the i individual, choos-
ing N
Ui(N) =
k∑
j=1
αNijnj − αNii + ωNi
and the utility that the individual will receive switching to Y :
Ui(Y ) = ω
Y
i .
The condition Ui(N) ≤ Ui(Y ) gives us the inequality
Ci ≡
n∑
j=1
αNij − αNii ≥ Xi.
Definition 3.31. The right upper corner from the Nash domain N(~`) is the point
CRU (~`) = (Ci(~`))i∈{1,...,k}, where
Ci(~`) = Ci −
k∑
j=1
Aijlj .
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Let us now justify the expression of Ci(~`). Write
Ui(Y ) =
k∑
j=1
αYij lj − αYii + ωYi
and let
Ui(Y → N) =
k∑
j=1
αNij (nj − lj) + ωNi
be the utility that i obtains changing to N . Recalling that Aij = αYij + α
N
ij , condition
Ui(Y ) ≥ Ui(Y → N) is equivalent to
k∑
j=1
Aijlj −
k∑
j=1
αNijnj − αYii ≥ −Xi,
that is,
k∑
j=1
αNijnj + α
Y
ii −
k∑
j=1
Aijlj ≤ Xi,
or, equivalently,
Ci + α
Y
ii + α
N
ii −
k∑
j=1
Aijlj ≤ Xi.
We can write this as
Ci +Aii −
k∑
j=1
Aijlj ≤ Xi.
Analogously, write Ui(N) =
∑k
j=1 α
N
ij (nj − lj)− αNii + ωNi and
Ui(N → Y ) =
k∑
j=1
αNij (nj − lj) + ωNi .
Condition Ui(N) ≤ Ui(N → Y ) is equivalent to
k∑
j=1
αNijnj − αNii −
k∑
j=1
Aijlj ≥ Xi.
Then, we obtain the conditions that Xi must satisfy to be in N(~`):
Aii + Ci −
k∑
j=1
Aijlj ≤ Xi ≤ Ci −
k∑
j=1
Aijlj .
Thus, the right upper corner of the Nash domain N(~`) is given by the last defini-
tion.
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Definition 3.32. We define the lower left corner of a Nash domain N(~`) as
CLoL(~`) = CUR(~`)−
k∑
i=1
|Aii|cˆi.
Definition 3.33. For all ~`= (l1, . . . , lk) ∈ X, we define
N(l1, . . . , lk) =
{
C + ~Z(l1, . . . , lk) + w/ w ∈ Q(l1, . . . , lk)
}
, (3.3)
where C = CRU (~0) is the right upper corner of N(~0) and w = (w1, . . . , wk) ∈
Q(l1, . . . , lk) if:
a) wi ∈ [Aii, 0], for li /∈ {0, ni}.
b) wi ∈ (−∞, 0], for li = 0.
c) wi ∈ [−|Aii|,+∞), for li = ni.
If (l1, . . . , lk) /∈ X, then there is no z = (z1, . . . , zk) ∈ Rk such that (l1, . . . , lk) is
Nash equilibrium, i.e., N(l1, . . . , lk) = ∅.
Lemma 3.34. Let li ∈ Xi. Then the Nash domain N(l1, . . . , lk) is given by (3.3).
Proof. We shall separate the proof in three parts. Let li ∈ {1, . . . , ni − 1}, for all i.
The (l1, . . . , lk) strategy is a Nash equilibrium if
U(i;Y ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(i;N ; l1, . . . , li − 1, . . . , lk)
and
U(i;N ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(i;Y ; l1, . . . , li + 1, . . . , lk),
for all individuals i. If we rearrange all these inequalities, we obtain the expression
given in a).
Now, let li = 0, for some i. In that case, (l1, . . . , lk) is a Nash equilibrium if
U(i;N ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(i;Y ; l1, . . . , li + 1, . . . , lk),
and
U(j;Y ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(j;N ; l1, . . . , lj − 1, . . . , lk)
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and
U(j;N ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(j;Y ; l1, . . . , lj + 1, . . . , lk),
for all individuals j 6= i. Rearranging all these inequalities, we obtain the expression
given in b).
Let li = ni, for some i. In this case, (l1, . . . , lk) is a Nash equilibrium if
U(i;Y ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(i;N ; l1, . . . , li − 1, . . . , lk),
and
U(j;Y ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(j;N ; l1, . . . , lj − 1, . . . , lk)
and
U(j;N ; l1, . . . , lk) ≥ U(j;Y ; l1, . . . , lj + 1, . . . , lk),
for all individuals j 6= i. Rearranging these inequalities, gives us the expression
c).
We will separate the cases 2 × 2 and k × 2, with k > 2, as the 2 × 2 admits
an easier geometrical interpretation and allows us to understand better the k > 2
situation.
Let us start with the 2×2 case. Recall that ~ci = −|Aii|cˆi, where cˆi are the vectors
from the canonical basis of R2.
Definition 3.35. The centre of Nash domain N(~`), denoted by CN (~`), is defined as
CN = CN (~`) =
{
CRU (~0) + ~Z(~`)−
2∑
i=1
|Aii|
2
cˆi
}
,
where CRU (~0) is the right-upper corner of N(~0).
The geometrical situation is shown in Figure 3.1.
Definition 3.36. Let us define the diamond whose vertices are the centres of the
domains N(~`), N(~`+ cˆj), N(~`+ cˆi) and N(~`+ cˆj + cˆi), as
L(~`) =
{
CN (~`) +
2∑
i=1
xiei/ xi ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
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Figure 3.1: Geometrical interpretation of the introduced concepts. Red colour corresponds
to direction j and blue color to direction i.
The centre of the diamond is defined by
CL = CL(~`) =
{
CN (~`) +
1
2
2∑
i=1
~ei
}
.
(See Figure 3.2)
Figure 3.2: Diamond L(~`) with its centre, CL(~`).
Remark 3.37. We have that L(~`) ⊂ N is equivalent to N = R2, as the pattern
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shown in Figure 3.2 is repeating all over the plane (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: The diamond is repeating all over the plane.
Our aim is to cover the diamond L(~`) by the Nash domains that are able to cover
it. We would like to give equivalent conditions to L(~`) ⊂ N .
We start pointing out that the centre CL(~`) must be the first point to be covered:
if the centre is not covered by any domain of the ones appearing in Figure 3.4, then
there are some points which are not covered (the centre, at least).
Figure 3.4: Domains that can first cover the centre CL(~`).
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Observe that CL(~`) /∈ N(~`), N(~`+ cˆi + cˆj). In a degenerated case, maybe CL(~`)
could be in the boundary of those domains, but in that case it is also on the domains
N(~`+ cˆi) and N(~`+ cˆj).
We want to ensure that the centre is covered, although if this condition is verified,
there can be some points which are not covered, as we shall see later.
We will try now to give conditions that ensure that any given point ~B ∈ L(~`) is
inside of any of the four Nash domains which forms the diamond.
In a general situation, given ~V and ~P in Rk, we would like to know whether ~V
is above or below the line (or hyperplane, in general) Hi(~P ). For that, let us define
~U = ~V − ~P . Observe that (~U)i = (~V )i − (~P )i.
In this situation, we can define:
Definition 3.38. We say that
• ~V is upper Hi(~P ) when (~U)i = (~V )i − (~P )i > 0.
• ~V is lower Hi(~P ) when (~U)i = (~V )i − (~P )i < 0.
• ~V is on Hi(~P ) when (~U)i = (~V )i − (~P )i = 0.
Figure 3.5: ~V is upper Hi(~P )
Remark 3.39. If ~Q ∈ Hi(~P ), then ( ~Q)i = (~P )i, so (~V )i − ( ~Q)i = (~V )i − (~P )i.
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Figure 3.6: ~V is lower Hi(~P )
Going back to our case, we can use this definitions to know whether ~B ∈ L is
inside a Nash domain or not. For this, we introduce the following notation.
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Notation 13. Given i ∈ {1, 2}, denote by:
• H i(~`) = Hi
(
CN (~`) +
1
2
2∑
i=1
|Aii|cˆi
)
.
• H i(~`) = Hi
(
CN (~`)− 1
2
2∑
i=1
|Aii|cˆi
)
.
Definition 3.40. Given ~B ∈ L ⊂ R2, we have that ~B ∈ N(~`) if and only if ~B is upper
H i(
~`) and lower H i(~`), for all i ∈ {1, 2}, that is,
• ( ~B)i −
(
CN (~`)− 12
∑2
i=1 |Aii|cˆi
)
i
> 0,
• ( ~B)i −
(
CN (~`) +
1
2
∑2
i=1 |Aii|cˆi
)
i
< 0,
for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
Remark 3.41. In the situation where the vectors can be left or right with respect to
a given hyperplane, we shall talk about lower and upper when the vector is respec-
tively, to the left and to the right with respect to the given hyperplane, respectively.
Of high interest will be the situation when ~B ≡ CL(~`). In this situation, the two
domains N(~`+ cˆj) and N(~`+ cˆi) will cover the centre at the same, for, as we shall
see now, whenever CL(~`) ∈ N(~`+ cˆj), then also CL(~`) ∈ N(~`+ cˆi) and vice-versa.
Lemma 3.42. Let Aii < 0. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) CL(~`) is upper H i(~`+ cˆj) = Hi(~ej +
~ci
2 ).
(2) CL(~`) is lower H i(~`+ cˆi) = Hi(~ei − ~ci2 ).
Proof. By its definition, (1) is equivalent to
~Bi −
(
~ej +
~ci
2
)
i
> 0,
which is equivalent to
−1
2
(Aij +Aii)− (−Aij −Aii/2) > 0,
which is also equivalent to
Aij
2
> 0.
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In the same way, (2) is equivalent to say
~Bi −
(
~ei − ~ci
2
)
i
< 0,
which is equivalent to
−1
2
(Aij +Aii)− (−Aii +Aii/2) < 0,
which is also equivalent to
−Aij
2
< 0.
Remark 3.43. In a similar way, when Ajj < 0, one can prove the equivalence of
(1) CL(~`) is upper Hj(~`+ cˆi) = Hj(~ei +
~cj
2 ).
(2) CL(~`) is lower Hj(~`+ cˆj) = Hj(~ej − ~cj2 ).
As a consequence of this fact, we obtain the following.
Corollary 3.44. In the case that CL(~`) ∈ N(~`+ cˆj), then, also CL(~`) ∈ N(~`+ cˆi) and
vice-versa, that is, CL(~`) ∈ N(~`+ cˆj) ∩N(~`+ cˆi).
To check if CL(~`) ∈ N(~`+cˆj)∩N(~`+cˆi), one should verify that the four conditions
from Definition 3.40 are met. Nevertheless, due to the geometry of the rectangles,
we can simplify this work, in the sense of the next remark.
Remark 3.45. We have the following, because of the geometry of the diamond:
(1) CL(~`) is lower H i(~`+ cˆj) = Hi(~ej − ~ci2 ).
(2) CL(~`) is upper Hj(~`+ cˆj) = Hj(~ej +
~cj
2 ).
As a consequence, we have only to check two of the four conditions from Defi-
nition 3.40 to know whether CL(~`) ∈ N(~`+ cˆj) ∩N(~`+ cˆi).
Lemma 3.46. The following statements are equivalent
(1) CN (~`) + 12~ej ∈ N(~`) ∪N(~`+ cˆj).
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(2) CN (~`) + 12x~ej ∈ N(~`) ∪N(~`+ cˆj), for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. (2)⇒ (1) is true, taking x = 12 .
(1) ⇒ (2). Assume that the point CN (~`) + 12~ej is covered by the two Nash
domains. Let us see that the points CN (~`) + 12x~ej ∈ N(~`), with x ∈ [0, 12) are lower
H i(~`). Given x ∈ [0, 12), the fact that CN (~`) + 12x~ej is lower H i(~`) is equivalent, by
definition, to (
CN (~`) +
1
2
x~ej
)
i
−
(
CN (~`) +
1
2
2∑
i=1
|Aii|cˆi
)
i
< 0,
which can be rewritten as
(
1
2
x~ej − 1
2
2∑
i=1
|Aii|cˆi
)
i
< 0, (3.4)
Let us now prove (3.4). By hypothesis CN (~`) + 12~ej ∈ N(~`), which, by Definition
3.40, gives us that is below H i(~`), that is,(
1
2
x~ej
)
i
−
(
CN (~`) +
1
2
2∑
i=1
|Aii|cˆi
)
i
< 0,
condition which can be written as(
1
2
~ej − 1
2
2∑
i=1
|Aii|cˆi
)
i
< 0.
This last inequality implies (3.4), as 12x~ej <
1
2~ej .
It can be similarly proved that the points CN (~`) + 12x~ej ∈ N(~`), with x ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
are upper H i(~`+ cˆj), which concludes the proof.
Definition 3.47. For li ∈ Xi, define, 1 ≤ mi ≤ li as
mi =
⌈ |Aij |
2|Aii|
⌉
,
where d·e denotes the ceiling function, that is, a function such that dxe = y ∈ N,
where y − 1 < x ≤ y.
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Figure 3.7: Example with mj = 2 and mi = 1.
We will separate our discussion in the cases mi = mj = 1 and mi ≥ 2, for some
i ∈ {1, 2}. Let us start with mi ≥ 2. We start by stating this lemma, which just
tells us that, in fact, the domains obtained by mi, are in a good position to cover the
centre of the diamond, CL(~`).
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Lemma 3.48. Let mi ≥ 2. Then,
• CL is upper H i(~`+ cˆj − (mi − 1)cˆi).
• CL is lower H i(~`+ cˆj − (mi − 1)cˆi).
• CL is upper H i(~`+ cˆi + (mi − 1)cˆi).
• CL is lower H i(~`+ cˆi + (mi − 1)cˆi).
Proof. See figures 3.8 and 3.9.
Figure 3.8: Geometric proof of lemma 3.48
Now, we distinguish two cases, depending on if the centre ofN(~`+cˆi+(mi−1)cˆi)
is upper or lower (CL(~`))i.
(1) miAii ≥ (CL(~`))i.
(2) miAii < (CL(~`))i.
In case (1), it is necessary and sufficient to ask for the domains to reach the
centre of the diamond, CL(~`) In case (2), they must cover all of the diamond, as we
shall explain now.
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Figure 3.9: interpretation of mi.
Let us rewrite this cases, using the explicit expression of (CL(~`))i.
By definition, CL(~`) = 12(~ei + ~ej). As, (~ei + ~ej) = (Aji + Ajj)cˆj + (Aii + Aij)cˆi,
then (CL(~`))i = 12(|Aii|+ |Aij |).
Then, the two cases are
(1) miAii ≥ 12(|Aii|+ |Aij |)⇔ mi ≥ 12 +
|Aij |
2|Aii| .
(2) miAii < 12(|Aii|+ |Aij |)⇔ mi < 12 +
|Aij |
2|Aii| .
Let us start with the discussion for the case (1). We begin with two remarks.
Remark 3.49. We have that
• H i(~`+ cˆj − (mˆi − 1)cˆi) = H i(~`+ cˆj − mˆicˆi), for 1 ≤ mˆi ≤ mi.
• H i(~`+ cˆi + mˆicˆi) = H i(~`+ cˆi + (mˆi − 1)cˆi), for 1 ≤ mˆi ≤ mi.
Remark 3.50. We have that
L ⊂
mi⋃
mˆi=1
H i(
~`+ cˆj − (mˆi − 1)cˆi),
whereH i(~`+cˆj−(mˆi−1)cˆi) denotes the points which are upperH i(~`+cˆj−(mˆi−1)cˆi)
and lower H i(~`+ cˆj − (mˆi − 1)cˆi).
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Figure 3.10: Definition of Hi(~`).
Theorem 3.51. Let mi ≥ 2 and mi ≥ 12 +
|Aij |
2|Aii| . If
|Ajj | ≥
(
mi − 1
2
)
|Aji|,
then CL ∈ N(~`+ cˆj − (mi − 1)cˆi) ∩N(~`+micˆi). In that case, N = R2.
Proof. It follows using Remark 3.49 and Remark 3.50 and the following:
If N(~`+ cˆj − mˆicˆi) ∩ L 6= ∅, then
N(~`+ cˆj − (mˆi − 1)cˆi) ∩ L = L ∩ (H i(~`+ cˆj − (mˆi − 1)cˆi)).
Analogously, if N(~`+ cˆi + mˆicˆi) ∩ L 6= ∅, then
N(~`+ cˆi + (mˆi − 1)cˆi) ∩ L = L ∩ (H i(~`+ cˆi + (mˆi − 1)cˆi)).
As the domains N(~`+ cˆj − (mˆi − 1)cˆi) cover the upper half of the diamond, while
the domains N(~`+ cˆi + (mˆi − 1)cˆi) cover the lower half, then L ⊂ N and therefore
N = R2.
Let us now pass to the case (2). Let us think thatmi ≥ 2 and thus, the rectangles
have to grow on the direction of ~ci. We have to ask the domain which is in the height
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Figure 3.11: Case (1).
of the centre of the diamond, to cross until a point ~vj ∈ CN (~`), which is given by the
condition (~vj)i =
(
mi − 12
) |Aii| (see Figure 3.12).
As ~ej = (|Ajj |, |Aij |), we obtain that
~vj =
(
mi − 12
) |Aii|
|Aij | ~ej .
Now, let us obtain the expression of (~vj)j . We have that
(~vj)j =
(
mi − 1
2
)
|Aii| |Ajj ||Aij | .
In this case, the condition to cross (~vj)j is given by
mi|Aii| − (~vj)j ≤ 1
2
|Ajj |,
which can be rewritten as
mi|Aii| ≤ |Ajj |
(
1
2
+
(
mi − 1
2
) |Aii|
|Aij |
)
.
We can state now the following result.
Theorem 3.52. Let mi ≥ 2 and mi < 12 +
|Aij |
2|Aii| . If
mi|Aii| ≤ |Ajj |
(
1
2
+
(
mi − 1
2
) |Aii|
|Aij |
)
,
then CL ∈ N(~`+ cˆj − (mi − 1)cˆi) ∩N(~`+micˆi). In that case, N = R2.
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Figure 3.12: Caso (2)
Now let us shift to the case mi = mj = 1. In this case, the point CL is inside N ,
more precisely, in N(~`+ cˆj) ∩N(~`+ cˆi). But there can be points from the diamond
which are outside N .
Notation 14. Denote by Ni(~`) = N(~`) ∪N(~`+ cˆi) and Nj(~`) = N(~`) ∪N(~`+ cˆj).
We will distinguish between three different cases, depending on if CN (~`) + 12~ei
and CN (~`) + 12~ej are inside Ni(~`) and Nj(~`), respectively, or not. We observe that
CN (~`) +
1
2~ei ∈ Ni(~`) if and only if |Ajj | ≥ |Aji|, and, similarly, CN (~`) + 12~ej ∈ Nj(~`) if
and only if |Aii| ≥ |Aij |.
In the first case, consider that CN (~`) + 12~ei /∈ Ni(~`) and CN (~`) + 12~ej /∈ Nj(~`). As
this half-points are not covered, there exists points from the diamond L(~`) which are
not inside N .
In the second case, consider CN (~`) + 12~ei ∈ Ni(~`) and CN (~`) + 12~ej ∈ Nj(~`). In
this case, we conclude that L(~`) ⊂ N .
In the last case, we suppose that CN (~`) + 12~ei ∈ Ni(~`), CN (~`) + 12~ej /∈ Nj(~`)
(the case where CN (~`) + 12~ej ∈ Nj(~`) and CN (~`) + 12~ei /∈ Ni(~`) is symmetric to this
one). In this case, to ensure that L(~`) ⊂ N , we must make the Nash domains
larger in the direction of ~cj . First of all, we notice that CN (~`) + ~ej must go across
H i(~`) ∩N(~`). To justify this fact, recall that, by hypothesis CN (~`) + 12~ej /∈ N and so
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we have ( ~Ej)i > Aii, which implies, ( ~Ej/2)i > Aii/2 and (~ej/2)i > Aii/2. Recall
that (~ej)i = |Aij |.
Observe that CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej ∈ H i(~`). It follows that
(CN (~`))j ≤
(
CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej
)
j
≤ (CUR(~`))j ,
which means that CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej ∈ H i(~`) ∩ N(~`). If this was not true, then
(~ej)i 6=
(
~Ej
)
i
, which contradicts the definition of ~ej and ~Ej .
In a similar way, we can see that CN (~`) +
3|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej ∈ H i(~`+ cˆj) ∩N(~`+ cˆi + cˆj).
Figure 3.13: Geometrical situation on the third case. The point A1 corresponds to CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej , while B1 corresponds to CN (
~`) + 3|Aii|2|Aij |~ej . The black segments are the parts of the
vectors ~ej which are initially uncovered.
What we have to ask for CN (~`) + x~ej , x ∈ [0, 1] to be covered by N , that is
equivalent to CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej is upper Hj(
~`+ cˆi) = Hj(CLoL(~`+ cˆi)). The point
CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej is upper Hj(
~`+ cˆi) = Hj(CLoL(~`+ cˆi)) if and only if
|Aii||Ajj |
2|Aij | ≥ |Aji| −
1
2
|Ajj |.
Equivalently, |Ajj | (|Aii|+ |Aij |) ≥ 2|Aij ||Aji|.
Theorem 3.53. When mi = mj = 1, the centre of the diamond, CL, is inside N . In
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Figure 3.14: Situation when CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej (represented by A1) is upper Hj(
~`+ cˆi)
this situation, regarding to points of CN (~`) + 12~ei and CN (~`) +
1
2~ej , we have three
cases:
(1) CN (~`) + 12~ei /∈ Ni(~`), CN (~`) + 12~ej /∈ Nj(~`).
(2) CN (~`) + 12~ei ∈ Ni(~`), CN (~`) + 12~ej ∈ Nj(~`).
(3) CN (~`) + 12~ei ∈ Ni(~`), CN (~`) + 12~ej /∈ Nj(~`).
In case (1), N 6= R2. In case (2) N = R2. In case (3), the following statements are
equivalent:
• N = R2.
• CN (~`) +
|Aii|
2|Aij |~ej is upper Hj(
~`+ cˆi) = Hj(CLoL(~`+ cˆi)).
Proof. It follows from the previous discussion.
Putting together all the results obtained in this section, we arrive to the following
main theorem.
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Figure 3.15: Case (1)
Theorem 3.54. The Nash domain N is equal to R2 if and only if one of the following
conditions holds:
(i) For mi = mj = 1,
a) |Ajj | ≥ |Aji| and |Aii| ≥ |Aij |; or
b) |Ajj | ≥ |Aji|, |Aii| < |Aij | and |Ajj | (|Aii|+ |Aij |) ≥ 2|Aij ||Aji|.
(ii) For mi ≥ 2,
a) 2|Aii|mi ≥ |Aii|+ |Aij | and 2|Ajj | ≥ (2mi − 1)|Aji|; or
b) 2|Aii|mi < |Aii|+ |Aij | and |Ajj |(|Aij |+ (2mi − 1)|Aii|) ≥ 2mi|Aii||Aij |.
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Figure 3.16: Case (2)
Chapter 4
Conclusions
Here, we present a summary of the main results obtained in this thesis and we point
out some of the future work lines related with this thesis.
The study of the existence of pure Nash equilibria is a central issue in Game
Theory. Here, we carefully studied the shape of Nash domain N for the case of
dimension k = 2, that determines the existence of pure Nash equilibria. Since we
plan to extend our results to the case k > 2, we have formalized our results in a way
such that they can be extended to the k > 2 case.
We have shown that the general decision model is a polymatrix game. Hence,
we plan to use the method developed by P. Duarte and his collaborators for the
ODE associated to the polymatrix game to prove the existence of chaos for the
ODE associated to the general decision model. P. Duarte and his collaborators
have shown the existence of chaos for two examples: Lotka-Volterra equation and
polymatrix replicator. Since the natural candidates to apply their method are regions
without pure Nash equilibria and we have characterized these regions to the general
decision model, we have done the first step to study the existence of chaos for the
ODE associated to the general decision model.
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